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Heflin, Patrick E. (Ph.D., Leeds School of Business) 
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work settings 
 
Thesis directed by Professor Sharon F. Matusik 
 
Organizational control is a fundamental management process but has consistently 
presented a dynamic challenge to leadership.  As organizations have increased in size and 
complexity, however, control of processes and individual behavior has become progressively 
more difficult.  Membership in a group or organization does not necessarily imply aligned 
goals and behaviors, which can lead to dysfunction and create the perception that even more 
control is necessary.  In addition, technological progress in the design of electronic 
monitoring devices has made observation and data collection relatively cheap and easy.  
More and more organizations are choosing to gather data about employees in this manner, 
but this observation could have negative effects not readily seen.  These tactics could 
threaten employees and leave them in a negative emotional state where they look to 
reestablish their freedom, either directly or indirectly.  The seminal theorist Jack Brehm 
called this emotional state Psychological Reactance (1966).  I predict this elevated level of 
Reactance will result in behavioral reactions which can be ultimately harmful to the 
organization.  Other control strategies that attempt to create alignment between an 
individual’s identity and the company might be useful in mitigating these behaviors, 
particularly in relatively autonomous job settings where control is somewhat limited.  
This study tests the connection between how threatened an employee is by a control 
system, the psychological reactance experienced, and subsequent behaviors.  The perceived 
organizational justification for a system and the strength of the individual identity with the 
company are theorized to moderate these relationships, as well. 
My sample includes commercial airline pilots (N=217) who fly for a major U.S. 
airline.  I chose this group because their work environment is highly monitored yet they 
maintain a relatively large amount of autonomy.  The findings generally support the 
hypothesized relationships and suggest that organizations consider multiple courses of action 
as well as negative side effects when choosing control mechanisms. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction and Overview 
 
On October 21, 2009 Northwest Airlines flight 188 overflew Minneapolis-St. Paul airport 
by 150 miles.  By the time the pilots realized their error and turned back, the national security 
infrastructure was on alert and fighter interceptors were being readied for launch.  During the 
subsequent investigation, there have been multiple emotional calls for more monitoring of pilots 
through new and improved video capabilities.  Pilots and pilot unions, however, remain equally 
adamant in their opposition.  These opposing positions bring up an important question:  Why 
would pilots, who are already under heavy surveillance, be so vehemently opposed to another 
form of monitoring?  Is it possible they are equally as upset about current surveillance systems, 
but their frustration and anger manifest in different ways?  These questions form the basis of my 
research investigating monitoring and behavioral reactions in autonomous job settings. 
Organizational control is a fundamental management process but has consistently 
presented a dynamic challenge to leadership.  Membership adherence to organizational policies 
is critical to process effectiveness (Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999; Tyler & Blader, 2005; Vardi & 
Weitz, 2004).  As organizations have increased in size and complexity, however, control of these 
processes has become progressively more challenging.  Membership in a group or organization 
does not necessarily imply aligned goals and behaviors, which can lead to dysfunction and create 
the perception that even more control is necessary.  In 1791, Jeremy Bentham, an English 
philosopher and social theorist, addressed this problem of nonconforming behavior in a prison 
population.  He proposed a design called the “panopticon” where a relatively small, centrally 
located core of guards could monitor the entire prisoner population (Bentham, from Lyon, 1993).  
Bentham’s model was based on geometrical configuration as well as a lighting and shutter design 
that created asymmetric inspection, allowing the guards to see the prison cells while the 
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prisoners could not see the guards.  He asserted this aspect of the design, which allowed constant 
presumed inspection, was critical:  “…the more constantly the persons to be inspected are under 
the eyes of the persons who should inspect them, the more perfectly will the purpose of the 
establishment be attained (Bentham, from Lyon, 1993:  657).  The lighting and shutter design 
provided a subtle twist on ordinary surveillance.  Prisoners were not sure if they were being 
monitored, but were under the assumption that they were.  The innovation in the design, 
therefore, was the use of uncertainty in the observed as a means of subordination (Lyon, 1993: 
657). 
Bentham’s model is often used as a metaphor of modern bureaucratic control systems 
(Foucault, 1977).  As monitoring technology advances and costs decrease, management is 
tempted to implement these systems in an attempt to achieve increased awareness of employee 
behavior.  And, just as in Bentham’s design, if total awareness is not possible the threat of 
observation might be enough to alter behavioral patterns (Alder, 2001).  The catalytic theorist 
was Foucault, who in 1977 wrote about the benefits of the panopticon and how monitoring could 
be an effective solution to the control problem.  Foucault sparked a debate about the effects of 
monitoring along a diverse spectrum—from the “sharp end” of active observation to the “soft-
end” of somewhat innocuous and passive data collection (Lyon, 2006).  Organizational studies of 
monitoring have mainly centered on routinized job settings with relatively straightforward, 
discrete tasks (e.g. Alder & Ambrose, 2005; Stanton & Julian, 2002).  Results have been 
ambivalent, with negative effects such as increased stress, decreased trust, and lower job 
satisfaction but also positive influence on perceived fairness when the information collected is 
used as a source for objective feedback or job evaluation (Stanton & Julian, 2002). 
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These controls implemented by organizational stakeholders with power advantages are an 
attempt to guide overall organizational direction.  Power differentials are revealed most 
obviously in situations of ownership and control, but also in other relationships resulting from 
organizational function and design.  In this context, some theorists have characterized 
organizational control as contested relations of power (e.g. Knights & Vrudubakis, 1994).  The 
individual exertion of power in response to control measures is resistance.  But it has also been 
alternatively framed as “control directed upward” reflecting an active, agentic view of employee 
behavior (Mumby, 2005).   Past research on resistance was initially focused on organized, formal 
resistance practices such as worker protests, strikes, grievances, etc., that seemed to imply it was 
necessary for individuals to have group support or leadership prodding to be led down the path of 
resistant behavior (Prasad & Prasad, 2000:  388).  More recently, resistance has been theorized as 
a more subjective, spontaneous, and natural individualized response to the control exertions of an 
organization (Mumby, 2005; Scott, 1985).  The view of workers and employees as passive cogs 
in the production process has evolved to seeing them as active participants in power relationships 
(Mumby, 2005).  This idea of resistance as an everyday, endemic part of organizational behavior 
is reflected in the thoughts of some classic theorists.  Freud, for example, said that humans are 
the natural enemy of organized society, where a compromise exists between human wishes and 
repression (2002).  Weber’s “iron cage” described the bureaucratic institution as the most 
efficient organizational model to manage complexity, but is also in itself a source of power, 
creating a struggle with the individual by limiting autonomy and creativity (from Barker, 1993). 
One theory to help explain these individually unique resistant reactions is Psychological 
Reactance Theory.  It says individuals who are used to certain freedoms will exhibit reactionary 
behaviors if those freedoms are threatened (Brehm, 1966; 1972).  The Reactance literature 
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explores many different behaviors, and emphasizes their idiosyncratic nature.  A fundamental 
question in this research project is if strong perceived organizational controls relate to specific 
resistance behaviors.  In particular, I include a new construct in my model of resistant behavior:  
malicious compliance, where employees withhold discretionary behavior and work to the letter 
of the contract to intentionally harm the organization.   
 Anecdotal evidence from popular literature seems to indicate some organizations’ 
employees are less likely to have conflicting individual behavior which might reduce the 
perceived need for more intrusive control practices.  One explanation might be the extent to 
which an individual’s identity is aligned with the organization.  Both Identity Theory (e.g. 
Stryker & Burke, 2000) and Social Identity Theory (e.g. Tajfel & Turner, 1985; Hogg & Terry, 
2000) address the degree to which an individual identifies with a group’s norms, standards, and 
values, and this alignment might help explain behavioral variance.  By contributing to positive 
self-esteem and belongingness, identification has been shown to relate to a range of positive 
organizational behaviors, but may also affect employee resistance behaviors in the presence of 
perceived organizational control (Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Hogg & Terry, 2000).  As I will 
further discuss, socialization of employees can be another method of control (e.g. Ouchi, 1980) 
and many theorists see identity and alignment of norms and values as the mechanism through 
which socialization functions (Fleming & Spicer, 2007).    
 This project contributes to the research on individual resistance by investigating the 
antecedents of resistant behavior using Reactance Theory and more fully developing the idea of 
resistance disguised as compliance via the concept of “Malicious Compliance” or work-to-rule.  
It also adds to the monitoring literature by using a highly autonomous work setting, which has 
not been fully explored.  
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 The dissertation is organized as follows.  Chapter two will review the literature on 
control theory, individual reactions to control, psychological reactance, and identity theory.  
Following the literature review, Chapter three presents arguments for how and why individuals 
react to perceived organizational controls, with a set of hypotheses addressing the research 
questions of this study.  In Chapter four I present the data sources and sampling strategy, 
operationalization of variables, and the justification for the statistical analysis that will be used to 
examine the hypotheses.  Chapter five is the presentation of the data and the findings relative to 
the hypotheses.  Finally, I summarize this program and recommend further areas for research. 
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Chapter Two 
Literature Review 
 In this literature review, I begin by discussing organizational control theory, which is 
devoted to finding the most effective and cost-efficient methods to gain employee adherence to 
rules, procedures and expectations in order to reduce behavioral uncertainty (Barker, 1993; Tyler 
& Blader, 2005).  This rule-following behavior is thought to improve organizational efficiency 
and effectiveness.  Alternatively, theories on organizational resistance have evolved from 
analysis of large-scale labor “movements” to more micro-level reactions to control that are 
thought to be somewhat automatic behavioral responses to perceived loss of freedoms.  Next, I 
review the literature on behavioral control specifically through employee monitoring.  
Additionally, I review research findings on individual reactions to monitoring that finds both 
positive and negative outcomes.  Reactance theory has been used as an explanation for behaviors 
in many contexts, including consumer choice, failure of rehabilitation programs (a so called 
“boomerang effect”), and studies of persuasion (Quick & Stephenson, 2007).  Its use in 
organizational settings is somewhat limited, and is reviewed below.  The proposed behavioral 
model also includes identity salience as a moderating factor in employee behavioral reactions.  I 
review identity theories, particularly focusing on research that links identity and behavior. 
Organizational Control Mechanisms 
Organizational researchers have long investigated the relationship between the organization 
and the individuals who form its membership.  Weber in describing bureaucracy articulated a 
dominant control system, with both positive and negative effects (1958).  On the positive side, 
modern bureaucracies provide the structure and processes necessary for efficient large-scale 
operations.  On the negative side, individuals nestled in the folds of the organization have 
uniquely individual goals and desires, inevitably different from those of the emergent 
  
7 
organization, that can lead to divergent and possibly undesirable behaviors (Fleming & Spicer, 
2007).  These partially overlapping goals and their associated problems have been described as 
the fundamental problem of organizational effectiveness (e.g. Barnard, 1968).  Organizational 
controls are therefore enacted in an attempt to converge these individual activities and behaviors 
in order to operate the system in the most efficient manner.  In this context, control is an exercise 
in power to reduce behavioral uncertainty—in effect a new version of Taylor’s classic Scientific 
Management applied across the entire organization (Clegg, Courpasson, & Phillips, 2006). 
At its most basic form, organizational control can be reduced to two main strategies:  
control based on assessment of process actions (behavior control) and control based on the 
measurement of process outcomes (output control) (Ouchi & Maguire, 1975:  559).  Output 
controls are effective in that both the principal and agent can observe outcomes, and 
evaluative criteria are relatively easy to define.  Behavior controls are designed to ensure the 
agent’s effort and processes also meet the principal’s expectations, but it requires more 
involvement from principals (Ouchi, 1980).  The panopticon design is an example of 
primarily behavioral control.   
Output control, based on end-state employee production, has been theorized to be a 
suitable substitute for behavioral control (Ouchi & Maguire, 1975:  559).  In other words, an 
effective observation program of system outputs might render behavioral controls 
unnecessary, since production is meeting contractual expectations.  This idea is compelling 
as it has historically been more difficult to audit behavior than output and a dual system of 
control, assuming a certain level of redundancy, would waste resources.  Output controls 
alone, however, may not capture incongruent behaviors or processes that result in correct 
products by chance or destiny.  Given this consideration, therefore, the two control types are 
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not substitutable, and are best implemented under different circumstances (Ouchi & Maguire, 
1975). 
The determining factor for the optimum control solution is the level of information 
about the management process that is known to the principal (Eisenhardt, 1989).  In the case 
of complete information, a behavioral contract is the most efficient.  An outcome-based 
contract would needlessly transfer risk to the agent, as process outcomes could be flawed for 
reasons beyond the agent’s control.  In the case of incomplete information, an analysis is 
required between the costs of monitoring the agent versus the cost of measuring outcomes 
and transferring risk to the agent, which would presumably require a higher salary 
(Eisenhardt, 1989:  61).  Emerging technologies have facilitated new monitoring techniques 
that lower the cost, thereby tipping the scale toward behavioral monitoring in choosing a 
means of control (Stanton & Julian, 2002). 
Different theorists have outlined various mechanisms to enact output or behavioral 
control.  Widely considered the seminal theorist on the subject, Weber used the term 
“legitimate domination” to describe organizational authority and control, of which he 
theorized three “pure types” (1958).  Rational grounds are those which rest on a belief in the 
legality of rules and the legal right of those appointed to authority under such rules to issue 
commands.  Traditional grounds are based on established belief in traditions and rituals and 
those exercising authority in their spirit.  Finally, charismatic grounds depend on personal 
devotion to the exemplary character associated with the person who occupies the authority 
position.   
Taking Weber a step further in an important work on organizational control, William 
Ouchi assessed organizational relationships with a transaction costs perspective, describing 
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three different mechanisms that might be employed to mediate these transactions: Market, 
Bureaucracy, and Clan (1980).  These different mechanisms are how transactions are 
mediated, or “controlled”, between parties.  The mechanisms of control internal to the firm, 
bureaucratic and clan, are the most applicable to this research and will be the focus.  
Bureaucratic systems have generally emerged when markets do not provide enough 
information (price ambiguity) or there are few alternatives (small numbers of competitors) 
(Ouchi, 1980).  These situations result in increased transaction costs, which can be 
diminished by mediating the transaction within a bureaucratic system (Williamson, 1975).  
The bureaucracy provides structure and performance guidelines that can be less costly to 
enforce than market contracts.  Even within a bureaucracy, however, contracts and 
agreements are necessarily incomplete due to cognitive limitations (e.g. bounded rationality) 
and future-state uncertainty, leaving some aspects of performance to be continually 
negotiated (Williamson, 1975).  These contractual gray areas create spaces where there can 
be variation of employee effort and performance.  These areas of ambiguity and behavioral 
discretion are where clan control might be most effective, and was Ouchi’s main theoretical 
contribution.  It is dependent on members who maintain relatively congruent goals and 
objectives, and apply pressure to other members who appear to be drifting (Ouchi, 1980).  
One way to achieve this type of control is through the socialization of new individuals, which 
entails exposure and acquisition of the group norms and values (Feldman, 1981).  Direct 
control through bureaucratic mechanisms then becomes less important as the employees’ 
“instinctual” (through effective socialization) inclination is to do what is in the best interest 
of the firm (Ouchi, 1980:  132).   
More recent organizational studies have included socialization as a key normative 
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ingredient to effective and efficient controls (Gabriel, 1999).  The “excellence” literature of 
the 1980s and 1990s emphasized a new range of ideological and cultural controls to increase 
efficiency and effectiveness.  For example, Peters and Waterman used the term “loose-tight” 
to describe this move toward culture as control.  “Loose” control minimizes traditional 
bureaucratic rigidity, but only to be augmented by “tight” self-regulation through the 
internalization of a strong culture (1982).  The idea of culture as a management tool has 
gained strong support among organizational theorists and practitioners alike (Ray, 1986). 
Barker’s classic article explores “concertive control” as a value based system that changes 
the locus of authority from the bureaucratic structure to the individual worker (1993).  
Workers are able to establish behavioral norms by cultivating agreed-upon values and ideals 
held by the organization, not just management.   
Culture has also been shown to be related to several employee outcomes (e.g. Barney, 
1986).  Even those organizations, however, which espouse strong socialization and 
individual devotion, still rely on bureaucratic mechanisms of control (Fleming & Spicer, 
2007).  In this environment, organizations can be seen to use a strong culture, or clan control, 
to augment, instead of replace, bureaucratic mechanisms of control.  This combination is 
mostly associated with attempts t o control day-to-day employee attitudes and actions, or 
behavioral control, as opposed to a strictly production-oriented output control.  
Individual Resistance to Control 
How do people react to these organizational efforts to control and align behavior?  In 
many cases, employees comply with organizational rules and restrictions.  Adherence is 
commonplace, as the organization is generally designed to function within the design guidelines, 
and organizations reinforce compliant behavior with incentives and rewards (Tyler & Blader, 
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2005).  Also, people are generally inclined to do what they are told, especially if the source is an 
authority figure (Blair & Stout, 2001).  Ackroyd & Thompson note, however, “Control can never 
be absolute and in the space provided by the indeterminacy of labour, employees will constantly 
find ways of evading and subverting managerial organization and direction of work.  This 
tendency is a major source of the dynamism in the workplace” (italics added for emphasis) 
(1999:  47). 
The focus of this research is this resistance behavior that has recently been theorized to 
be as omnipresent as adherence (e.g. Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999; Prasad & Prasad, 2000; Scott, 
1985).  Resistance and adherence are now seen not as opposite ends of a behavioral continuum, 
but instead somewhat orthogonal and even occurring simultaneously in the same employee 
(Jermier, Knights, & Nord, 1994; Spitzmuller & Stanton, 2006).  In fact, one of the main 
propositions of this paper is that in certain situations, adherence to organizational obligations can 
actually be a resistance behavior. 
Research on resistance spans a broad spectrum of behavior, from organized, purposeful 
actions in response to specific instances of organizational control to more innocuous, individual-
level actions that are unplanned and somewhat routine (Prasad & Prasad, 2000).  Early industrial 
sociologists were eager to view large-scale labor actions in the context of the wider social 
order (Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999).  These theorists, mainly inspired by Marxist class-
struggle ideology, viewed resistance as a somewhat romanticized, collectively organized 
action based on class and power differential (Mumby, 2005).  Organizations from the 
industrial revolution through the 1970s and 1980s provided a rich backdrop for these visions 
of exploited workers uniting to overthrow the powerful capitalist leadership.  Reactions to 
control regimes were seen as homogenous across individuals, with very little difference in 
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interpretation or attitudes and behavior (Matusik & Mickel, 2011).  The focus on this type of 
resistance was unsatisfying because workers were viewed as “apprentice revolutionaries 
whose behavior and attitudes are evaluated against an a priori and unrealistic model of social 
agency and change” (Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999).  That particular research stream had very 
little focus on the everyday struggle of organizational life and the unique ways members 
actively engage in the dynamic interplay between management and worker.  A more nuanced 
view of the dialectic nature between control and resistance would lead to the inclusion of a 
wider spectrum of individual behavior.   
Labor Process Theory (LPT), following the pioneering work of Braverman (1974), 
focuses on the dynamics of labor processes, which narrows the typical Marxist class struggle 
but also provides a broader view of the simple wage-effort agreement of industrial 
sociologists (Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999).  LPT views resistance as individual reactions to 
the structure imposed by management, as opposed to an orchestrated prelude to revolution.  
This transition to a stronger view of individual worker agency is a fundamental aspect of 
LPT and is a clear move away from the neo-Marxist attitude that workers are passive cogs in 
the production process (P. Prasad & Prasad, 2000).  LPT also takes a more subjective and 
micro analytic view of the power struggle between authority and employee.  As Andrew 
Friedman writes, “It is important to examine how the capitalist mode of production has 
accommodated itself to worker resistance, rather than simply how the capitalist mode of 
production might be overthrown through worker resistance” (1977:  48).  In other words, the 
production process has evolved in relation to worker resistance, just as resistance evolves to 
process controls instituted by management.  Management adapts labor processes in an 
attempt to minimize and contain workplace resistance, but out of these evolving processes 
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come new opportunities for workers to evade, disrupt, and push back in a reinforcing cycle 
(Edwards, 1979).  This is the essential principal emerging in the organizational resistance 
literature:  resistance as inevitability and a part of the social fabric of organizational life, 
which goes hand-in-hand with organizational processes in many ways designed to control it 
(Ball, 2005). 
Most contemporary organizational resistance studies retain and extend the 
fundamental tenets of LPT, focusing on behaviors of agentic workers that are generally 
routine, subdued, or covert (Ashcraft, 2005; Ball, 2005; Mumby, 2005; Murphy, 1998; A. 
Prasad & Prasad, 1998; P. Prasad & Prasad, 2000).  Some forms of resistance continue to be 
organized, openly hostile actions toward management, but much of the research observes 
more subtle behaviors that fill the void of ambiguous expectations with regard to 
organizational practices (Mumby, 2005).  These behaviors represent an active, creative 
worker who is able to undermine managerial control and create unforeseen consequences that 
often require even more managerial attention.   
While LPT diverged from the traditional Marxist view by espousing a calculative, 
purposive, and deliberate worker, more recent organizational theorists view resistance across 
a spectrum of behaviors, some highly conscious and intentional and others more 
subconscious and routine (Ball, 2005).  Resistance is seen as a “configuration of emotional 
responses, patterned behavior, intellectual assumptions, and reasoned decisions—related to 
specific worker subjectivities” (P. Prasad & Prasad, 2001:  110).   
Routine forms of resistance have become the focus and central component in the 
struggle over workplace control.  These routine, also called informal, behaviors are generally 
unplanned and spontaneous and can also be covert (Nord & Jermier, 1994; Scott, 1985).  It is 
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a difficult, and most likely fruitless, task to try and develop a list of behaviors that might be 
considered “routine resistance”.  This is because of the subjective, ever-changing nature of 
the interplay between control and resistance.  What is resistance to one employee might be an 
unintentional oversight to another (Spitzmuller & Stanton, 2006).  A resistant behavior at one 
time might evolve into a habitual behavior in the same employee that no longer carries the 
meaning “resistance”.  This difficulty led A. Prasad & Prasad to categorize different resistant 
behaviors found in the literature into four general groupings (1998):  (a) open confrontations 
to supervisors and clients (b) subtle subversions of control systems through the use of gossip 
and horseplay (c) employee withdrawal and disengagement and (d) ambiguous 
accommodations to authority (A. Prasad & Prasad, 1998).  This typology, with fairly general 
categories, is still not comprehensive enough to cover all possible resistant behaviors. The 
level of intentionality would also be an important variable to distinguish levels of resistance 
in individual behaviors.   
Organizational members develop these types of routine resistances discursively in a 
very subjective and context-specific manner (P. Prasad & Prasad, 2001).  The “central 
problematic” in this research, therefore, has become how to define, observe, and analyze 
resistant behaviors other than well-defined, collective action (Ball, 2005).  One problem is 
that these behaviors tend to be in the domain of the “informal organization” which is less 
visible and more ambiguous than the observable aspects of the formal organization.  In field 
research and experimental settings, it may be difficult for the researcher to detect resistant 
behavior that the subject intends to hide.  Other obvious behaviors the researcher assumes is 
resistant may in fact be an error by the subject with no resistant intent.  For example, in the 
airline industry, the pilot hat is a symbol of professionalism that has been part of the uniform 
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for many years.  Recently, pilots have been “forgetting” to wear the hat as a sign of 
displeasure with management, in effect a very public display of resistant behavior.  Some 
pilots, however, used the occasion to leave the hat home simply because they do not like it, 
not as the result of any resistant intentions to certain controls.  It would be difficult in this 
case, if not impossible, to determine accurate resistance intentions by mere observation.  
Holding true to evolving processes, management responded by making the hat an optional 
part of the uniform.   
Behavioral Control Through Employee Monitoring   
In Sociology, control and conflict between the ruling class and proletariat is a strong 
and recurring theme.  Attewell (1987) asserted that performance monitoring has been in use 
as long as there has been industry and production.  Bureaucratic control has been 
characterized as a movement away from societies that base their intersocial exchanges on 
trust and primary relations, or Gemeinschaft toward contractual societies, or Gesellschaft 
(Toennies, 1940 from Ouchi & Johnson, 1978:  310).  These ideas embodied in recent 
organizational theories, such as Agency Theory, can be associated with the continued 
emergence of this contractual society.  Under Agency Theory, characterization of owner-
employee relationships is based on the presumption that employees (or “agents”) do not have 
aligned objectives with owners (or “principals”).  Principals attempt to force the agent’s 
objectives into alignment using several strategies, including monitoring, auditing, formal 
control systems, budget restrictions, and the establishment of incentive compensation 
systems (Jensen and Meckling, 1976:  323).  With tangible costs decreasing and 
technological capabilities increasing, monitoring is becoming a more attractive option in an 
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attempt to increase principal-agent goal congruence, across multiple employment 
relationships (Holman, Chissick, & Totterdell, 2002:  58).   
Employee performance monitoring includes observation, examination, and recording 
of work actions and behaviors (Stanton, 2000).  In general, research on monitoring has 
labeled two types, “traditional” and “electronic” (also known as Electronic Performance 
Monitoring, or EPM) (e.g. Holman, et al, 2002; Stanton, 2000; Stanton & Julian, 2002).  
Traditional monitoring includes actions involving human-to-human interaction, such as 
direct observation, listening to calls or conversations, work sampling, and self-reporting 
(Stanton, 2000).  Recent technological developments have facilitated new techniques for 
monitoring and make up the category “electronic monitoring”.  These techniques include 
automatic and remote monitoring of behavior, using audio and video recording, keystroke 
analysis, and event duration evaluation (Stanton & Julian, 2002).  EPM, relatively 
independent from direct human involvement, lends itself more readily to continuous 
monitoring of employee behavior (Holman, et al, 2002). 
Three main features characterize monitoring:  content, purpose, and employee 
“monitoring cognitions” (Holman, et al, 2002).  The content of performance monitoring 
includes objective qualities, such as frequency, feedback, performance criteria, source, and 
target.  The purpose of performance monitoring is derived from how managers will use the 
data (e.g. developmentally, punitively, or informatively) (Holman, et al, 2002).  Monitoring 
cognitions refer to the perceptions and attitudes of employees about the monitoring.  Specific 
factors that affect perception include assessments of its fairness, whether or not the 
monitoring system is trusted, and the perceived intensity of the monitoring (Stanton & Julian, 
2002). 
  
17 
Early monitoring research focused primarily on the content and purpose of the 
systems.  Recently, monitoring cognitions have been investigated, particularly the perceived 
fairness of the system by employees.  Moorman & Wells (2003) found significant 
relationships between perceived fairness and job satisfaction variables, but did not find any 
relationship to task performance.  Alder & Ambrose (2005) propose a relationship between 
fairness judgments and behavioral outcomes, integrating feedback, justice, and monitoring 
research.   
Individual Reactions to Monitoring.  Research on how individuals react under 
surveillance is well established and spans multiple disciplines.  A large body of research in 
Psychology has investigated the phenomenon generally known as reactivity, and more 
specifically labeled “researcher-expectancy effect”, “subject-expectancy effect”, “pygmalion 
effect”, etc., depending on the context.  These all describe the situation that occurs when 
individuals are aware of being observed or measured and subsequently modify their behavior 
from what would have been “normal”.  More recent system designs, however, place employees 
under nearly constant observation, making it important to determine the nature of behavioral 
reactions under these conditions.  Recent EPM research is an effort to do so, and has arguably 
taken on a larger relevance because of its emerging prevalence in organizations (Alder & 
Ambrose, 2005).   
From an individual perspective, research on monitoring has found relationships with 
both negative and positive outcomes for employees.  Generally, monitoring techniques 
(traditional and electronic) create positive reactions in that they can provide a social cue of 
what the employer considers important, and how the process should be carried out (Kidwell 
& Bennet, 1994; Stanton & Julian, 2002).  Also, when used in specific, usually prearranged 
  
18 
ways, such as a source for feedback, monitoring has been shown to have positive effects on 
well-being and job satisfaction (Alder & Ambrose, 2005; Holman, et al., 2002:  61; Stanton 
& Julian, 2002).  For example, a manager might use data collected from an EPM program 
that provides highly accurate, objective data in evaluating employee performance.   
A large portion of EPM literature, however, describes negative reactions.  These 
reactions can be organized into two general categories, internal and external (behavioral) 
(Botan, 1996).  Internal effects describe issue as stress, uncertainty, boredom, depression, 
anxiety, anger, feelings of vulnerability, or a loss of privacy.  Numerous studies have 
corroborated the notion that monitored employees have higher levels of these internal effects 
(e.g. Aiello & Kolb, 1995; Henderson, Mahar, Saliba, Deane, & Napier, 1998; Holman, et 
al., 2002; Syndersmith & Cacioppo, 1992).   
External effects manifest in the behaviors the employee adopts in response to 
monitoring, including resistance, performance, and productivity.  Research on performance 
and productivity shows mixed results.  Two studies apply the Social Facilitation Framework, 
which says that work in the presence of another person will tend to result in increased 
performance on simple tasks and decreased performance on complex tasks (Zajonc, 1965).  
Electronic monitoring was thought to be a valid substitute for the “other person”, and in general 
these predictions were supported (Aiello & Svec, 1993; Griffith, 1993).  A study excluding task 
type, however, showed that EPM may be detrimental to performance by inducing workers to 
focus on the metric being measured causing a drop in product quality (Grant, Higgins, & Irving, 
1988).  Stanton & Barnes-Farrell used perceptions of control as a mechanism leading to 
individual performance, showing that the use of EPM related to lower perceptions of control, and 
subsequently lower levels of performance (1996).  
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Other research has shown a positive relationship at lower hierarchical levels of the 
organization, where means-ends relationships are usually well defined and tasks are 
relatively simple (Ouchi & Maguire, 1975).  Aiello & Kolb (1995), in a study of keystroke 
entry, found highly skilled monitored participants had higher performance than those who 
were not monitored.  A series of experiments by Nebeker & Tatum (1993), using goal setting 
as the theoretical basis, found enforcement of lower standards through monitoring was 
related to higher job performance and job satisfaction than the enforcement of more difficult 
standards (1993).  These studies offer additional support for the idea that EPM effectiveness 
on performance is somewhat task-dependent.  
Research on resistant behavior as a reaction to performance monitoring has mostly 
investigated individual micro-practices that subvert the functioning of the control system 
(Vorvoreanu & Botan, 2001).  These behaviors are wide-ranging, as previously noted, and 
include vandalism, unwarranted absenteeism, theft (Lawrence & Robinson, 2007), sabotage 
(Gottfried, 1994; LaNuez & Jermier, 1994), stories (Ewick & Silbey, 1995), and humor 
(Collinson, 1988).   
These types of behaviors are generally observable to a manager or researcher, but 
other behaviors that are below the surface have not been thoroughly explored in the 
literature.  In fact, the majority of empirical studies are conducted using laboratory experiments 
or job settings with relatively low-level, simple tasks, with recent exceptions (Ashcraft, 2005; 
Tyler & Blader, 2005).  This highlights two gaps in this research.  First, the laboratory as 
research setting has the potential to introduce subject-expectancy effects that impact the validity 
of any findings.  While an experiment may be well suited for surveillance-performance data, it 
seems particularly difficult to discover the routine, below the surface resistance behaviors that 
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might be present in the individual.  Ethnological methods and survey response might help 
uncover these hidden attitudes and behaviors.  Second, the tasks observed in nearly all EPM 
studies are fairly simple, repetitive assignments that are usually found at the lower end of the 
organizational hierarchy.  There is a great need, as more capable monitoring is deployed across 
the employment spectrum, of determining the effects on relatively autonomous employees who 
accomplish complex and difficult tasks in the execution of their duties.  Variance in behavioral 
reactions in this realm might be explained by other factors, including feelings of reactance and 
identity salience, which are discussed below.   
Psychological Reactance Theory 
 Psychological reactance theory, also called reactance theory, says that an aversive 
reaction occurs in individuals in response to controls that inhibit freedom of behavior and 
autonomy (Brehm, 1966).  A perceived threat to established freedoms is the catalyst for an 
emotional state known as psychological reactance.  This state elicits behaviors intended to 
restore the level of freedom previously in place.  The theory predicts a wide range of 
behaviors, from directly challenging the threat to indirectly attempting to establish greater 
autonomy in other areas (Brehm & Brehm, 1981).  In fact, reactance can often result in 
individuals acting in the opposite manner of which they were encouraged by the control 
measure to act (Brehm & Brehm, 1981).  The nature of the relationship between direct and 
indirect behaviors, such as a progression from direct to indirect reactions, is not theorized in 
the reactance literature.  In the employment context, however, it may be more likely for an 
employee to tend toward indirect behaviors in order to preserve employment status.  
 Reactance Theory has been used in fields that analyze reactions to persuasion, like 
counseling for substance abuse or marketing (Lessne & Venkatesan, 1989).  The argument in 
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these contexts is that individuals perceive a “loss of behavioral choice” and react in an 
attempt to compensate for this loss (Brehm & Brehm, 1981).  There are also several 
examples of reactance theory in Organizational Behavior, particularly to help explain 
behaviors that appear to deviate from the norm.  Two studies used reactance theory as a 
possible theoretical basis for decisions by employees to withhold Organizational Citizenship 
Behaviors, in an attempt to regain a measure of control (Niehoff & Moorman, 1993; Zellars, 
Teppar, & Duffy, 2002).  From Niehoff & Moorman: 
 If people have a need to feel competent and self-determining, managerial 
behaviors that limit their freedom, such as observing them at work or keeping tabs on 
their work progress, could elicit “psychological reactance” (Brehm, 1972).  Such 
“reactance” could take the form of poor job attitudes, minimum levels of effort, or 
both.  An employee having such reactions would be unlikely to exhibit discretionary 
behaviors reflecting efforts above and beyond the norm (1993:  530).  
 
Other studies have theorized reactance as a mechanism for exhibiting certain behaviors in 
new employment situations (Ashforth, 1989) and to explain whistle blowing (Dozier & 
Miceli, 1985).  Lawrence & Robinson use reactance theory in a qualitative piece to explain 
deviant behavior as manifestations of resistance to episodes of organizational exertion of 
power (2007).   
 Organizational applications of reactance theory have almost exclusively been 
theoretical in nature.  Reactance scholars say the limited application of the construct in 
empirical studies lies in its ephemeral nature, but this has changed over the last decade with 
the operationalization and development of a scale for both trait (Hong, 1992: Hong & 
Faedda, 1996) and state (Dillard & Shen, 2005) reactance measures.  Research using these 
measures has primarily been in psychology under the persuasive communication literature 
(Burgoon, Alvaro, Grandpre, & Vouladakis, 2002; Quick & Bates, 2010).  One way an 
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organization might temper a negative reaction to control might be to foster strong 
identification within the individual, a concept more discussed more fully below.  
 
Identity Theories 
Organizational control that is centered on the socialization of the individual often 
does so by increasing the congruence of the individual’s norms and values with other 
members as well as with the organization as a whole (Ouchi, 1980).  A difficulty, however, is 
that modern organizations can create a multitude of identities, each with their own set of 
values.  Many associations now challenge the traditional, somewhat monolithic “firm” that in 
many ways was the mainstay of the individual identity (Foreman & Whetten, 2002).  As 
noted by Albert & Whetten in their seminal work on multiple organizational identities: 
In both everyday language as well as in more formal scientific discourse, 
we tend to treat most organizations as if they were either one type of another, 
for example, church or state, profit or nonprofit.  This taxonomic tradition 
assumes that most organizations have a single and sovereign identity.  The 
alternative assumption is that many, if not most, organizations are hybrids 
composed of multiple types (1985:  270). 
 
Adding to the complexity, companies and employees in today’s economy are experiencing 
rapid change, mergers and acquisitions, and frequent layoffs and job transfers.  Many 
members of modern organizations have affiliations with multiple entities internal and 
external to the organization, resulting in individual members that can identify, with varying 
intensity, with many different aspects of professional life  (Foreman & Whetten, 2002). 
This situation is echoed in much of the identity literature, describing processes 
that are convoluted by the presence of dual or multiple identity claims on an individual 
(McCall & Simmons, 1978; Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Cheney, 1991; Foreman & Whetten, 
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2002).  Identity salience is the self-concept that is most central to the individual in the 
given situational conditions (Stryker & Burke, 2000).  The rise of professions and 
members who closely identify with the services they provide leads to a lower degree of 
identity with specific companies, particularly in those with a relatively weak socialization 
program (Whetten, Lewis, & Mischel, 1992).  The identity salience in this hybrid 
environment is thought to affect behavioral reactions to control, such that those 
employees whose most salient work identity is aligned with the company will display 
fewer resistance behaviors. 
Identity-Behavior Relationship.  Cognitive identity can affect a person’s well-being 
and behavior because individuals either assume attributes of the group or they assume others 
infer certain attributes about them due to their group membership (Dutton, Dukerich, & 
Harquail, 1994: 240).  Stryker & Burke theorize that the higher the salience of an identity 
relative to other identities incorporated into the self, the greater the probability of behavioral 
choices in accord with expectations attached to that identity (2000:  286).  Tajfel, et al, from 
the Social Identity Theory literature, explored the pervasiveness of social categorization and 
identification and its potential effect on behavior: 
An important cognitive consequence of this pervasiveness is that the 
articulation of an individual’s social world in terms of its categorization into 
groups becomes a guide for his conduct in situations to which some criteria of 
intergroup division can be meaningfully applied.  (‘Meaningful’ need not be 
‘rational’.)  An undifferentiated social environment makes very little sense and 
provides no guidelines for action (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971) 
 
A person’s identities are not necessarily separate, but instead woven into a complex system, 
or a cumulative identity.  Yet there remains a hierarchy in which these identities are loosely 
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arranged, and this hierarchy in large part is determined by what we see as our “ideal self”, 
from which our behavioral norms and self-esteem is derived (McCall & Simmons, 1966). 
Summary 
Control in a society, and more narrowly in an organization, can be generalized as 
managing the tension between the natural human tendency of individual creativity and the need 
to maintain functionality in our socially embedded processes.  “Control” has been alternatively 
derided and embraced, depending on the relative position of the perspective-holder (Barker, 
2005).  Organizations are designed to create value, and leaders and managers are entrusted to 
ensure that value is maintained.  More control is conventionally seen by managers as a benefit to 
this effort, but variance in employee reaction to these measures make further research an 
important step in identifying optimal control strategies (Tyler & Blader, 2005).     
Theories of organizational control and employee resistance originally assumed a 
somewhat passive, uninterested individual employee who would be motivated to resist only in 
large-scale, coordinated job actions.  Control theories have evolved to emphasize the role of the 
individual more, through socialization programs and group membership effects such as peer 
standard setting and enforcement (e.g. Barker, 1993; Ouchi, 1980).  Resistance theories have 
evolved, as well, envisioning resistance as a somewhat innate individual behavior defying the 
impersonal will of the system through a variety of means, mostly routine and unique to the 
individual situation (Prasad & Prasad, 2000).    
Interest in control and resistance theories has seen resurgence in recent decades due to a 
revolution of sorts in monitoring techniques and capabilities.  New technology makes monitoring 
less intrusive, and possibly more importantly, more cost efficient, which provides incentive for 
managers to try to implement these control strategies.  EPM techniques in the workplace 
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include automatic and remote monitoring of behavior, primarily using video recording but 
also audio recording, keystroke analysis, and event duration evaluation (Stanton & Julian, 
2002).  The critical distinction between EPM and traditional surveillance is that EPM can be 
conducted without human interface, and without the direct knowledge of the employee.  
Evidence from the field indicates a rapid increase in the use of EPM, which requires a more 
thorough understanding of the effects on employees (Alder & Ambrose, 2005).   
Initial EPM research focused on characteristics of the system itself, with individual 
outcomes primarily focused on performance and job satisfaction (Stanton, 2000).  Aspects 
such as frequency (Niehoff & Moorman, 1993), controllability (Stanton & Barnes-Farrell, 
1996), and source expertise (Stanton, 2000) were found to have some positive relationship to 
these outcomes.  Other systemic characteristics, such as using the data as a source for 
feedback, have also been shown to have positive effects on well-being and job satisfaction 
(Alder & Ambrose, 2005; Holman, et al., 2002; Stanton & Julian, 2002).  EPM systems that 
provide accurate, objective data in evaluating employee performance might be seen as a 
positive, especially if the employee is afforded the opportunity to provide developmental 
input beforehand (Stanton, 2000). 
Monitoring research on negative outcomes has focused primarily on adverse 
physiological reactions, including elevated heart rate and blood pressure, changes in skin 
conductance, increased fatigue and other factors generally associated with increased levels of 
stress.  While some may argue that increased stress to a certain degree leads to higher job 
performance, other outcomes such as increased job turnover, withdrawal, or depression might 
indicate the longer-term effects of monitoring need to be considered against short-term gains in 
performance (Stanton, 2000). 
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In general, researchers as well as practitioners assume that there is homogeneity when 
considering individual reception and reaction to monitoring programs:  On the positive side, 
performance and job satisfaction will improve if the system is done right, while on the negative 
side, physiological issues might arise that would make the employee somewhat more 
uncomfortable.  Little has been done to integrate the view that resistance is commonplace with 
the rapid expansion of control through monitoring.  It is important to determine what variance 
exists in resistant reactions, and the reasons for this variance.  Reactance, which is both a trait 
and state construct, has been shown to have varying levels across individuals, and in different 
situations (Brehm & Brehm, 1981).  Modern society also influences individuals by creating 
situations where they have competing self-concepts.  These multiple identities can compete 
against each other, often determining behavioral outcomes (Dutton, et al., 1994; Mael & 
Ashforth, 1992).   Another gap in this literature is that very little research has been accomplished in 
situations where jobs are autonomous and task relationships are ill-defined and dynamic.  In 
these cases, monitoring will provide information but the evaluator may be limited by a lack 
of situational, contextual, or process knowledge.  This may also lead to employee attitudes 
and behaviors that vary considerably and is a contextual variation that warrants more robust 
examination. An additional limitation of the monitoring research is that the setting has been primarily experimental, with a few exceptions (Moorman & Wells, 2003; Niehoff & Moorman, 1993; Tyler & Blader, 2005).  As noted, this creates an artificial environment where only the most salient reactions might be observed, such as improved task performance or physiological changes.  To understand the full range of behavioral 
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implications caused by the introduction of EPM systems, research should consider the employee in the work environment.  These well-established literature streams all seem to have 
a common feature of moving from a broad, somewhat monochromatic impression of 
organizations and their members to a more nuanced, multi-faceted view of unique individual 
perceptions and reactions to their personal organizational experience.  While laboratory 
experiments are useful in establishing relationships, it is also important to study these events in 
their true settings, as will be discussed in the development of the model and research design in 
the following chapters. 
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Chapter Three 
Model and Hypotheses 
The main themes of this research are that organizations have high perceived return on 
gathering data about their employees, individuals have unique reactions to these organizational 
exertions of power, and this employee resistance will be moderated by the strength and locus of 
their social identity.  Employee surveillance, particularly Electronic Performance Monitoring, 
has been increasingly used as a management tool and technology has made the systems more 
pervasive (Stanton, 2000).  Research on this resurgence has generally focused on the 
physiological and performance effects on individuals in experimental settings with fairly simple 
tasks to accomplish.  Autonomous workers studied in the field would presumably have different 
and possibly more extreme reactions to this type of control due to the freedom normally 
associated with their job.  This gap in the monitoring literature is an important genesis for a 
model of EPM and resistant behavior.   
Both Identity Theory from sociology and Social Identity Theory from social psychology 
predict behavioral outcomes based on the strength of individual identification with a group.   
Recent research on employee conduct has included this general idea of employee-organization 
alignment in different ways.  Tyler & Blader (2005) address a perceived “moral value 
congruence” as a mechanism for a self-regulatory control system.  Lawrence & Robinson (2007) 
say that the loss of identity at the hands of increased organizational power is the mechanism for 
frustration and resistance.  I argue that resistance behaviors are ubiquitous and a natural outcome 
of organizing, but they are moderated by the level of congruence between the individual identity 
and the organization.  
Individuals have been shown to vary in their need for autonomy, and it is critical for 
those in whom it is high because it is only through this ability to make decisions and choose 
  
29 
actions that they can maximize their satisfaction (Brehm, 1966).  An underlying assumption of 
reactance theory is that human beings have an inherent right to autonomy, and cherish their 
ability to choose among alternatives (Brehm, 1966).  Although reactance theory has been used in 
many disciplines to explain different behaviors, I have not discovered research that uses 
reactance to explain the link between control and resistance. It seems appropriate, therefore, that 
a study of resistance in autonomous settings use reactance theory as the mechanism to explain 
behavioral reactions. 
The following model graphically displays the conceptual relationships between the 
constructs.   
        Figure 1 
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Hypotheses 
 The initial step in this model is to determine the extent an employee perceives a threat to 
an established behavioral freedom.  An important distinction in reactance theory is that freedoms 
are considered to be concrete behavioral realities by the individual, not just hoped for or desired  
(Brehm & Brehm, 1981).  Any force that makes it more difficult for the individual to exercise 
this freedom is theorized to result in reactance (Brehm, 1966).  In this study, I argue 
organizational controls that attempt to dictate or modify previously established behaviors are 
thought to constitute a threat to the employee.  The controls may specifically target the 
threatened freedom.  On the other hand, the control might threaten a behavior that is collateral to 
the intended behavioral effect of the program.   
Reactance literature theorizes two important aspects of the perception of a threat and 
subsequent reactance (Dillard & Shen, 2005).  First is the strength of the threat to freedom and 
the second is the trait reactance proneness.  Some disciplines have used indicators such as “intent 
to persuade” and “language intensity” to measure the strength of an attempted influence (Dillard 
& Shen, 2005; Hong & Faedda, 1996).  A large portion of the reactance research is done by 
communication and persuasion scholars, who find the theory useful in studying “message 
effects” and their relation to a multitude of behaviors such as binge drinking, flossing, drug use, 
sun protection, etc. (Quick & Stephenson, 2007b).  Studies have supported the notion that 
messages using strong, intense, or forceful language that are perceived to threaten freedom of 
choice result in reactance (e.g. Dillard & Shen, 2005; Henriksen, Dauphinese, Wang, & Fortman, 
2004).  Other studies have focused on message structure and the use of inductive or deductive 
  
31 
reasoning, with varying results (Dillard & Shen, 2005).  Threat-to-choice language has been 
found to have the largest impact on subsequent individual reactance. 
While acknowledging the apparent validity of the observer-calculated threat strengths, I 
argue the perception of the individual is what ultimately determines the magnitude of a threat.  
Two different employees might have alternate interpretations of a strongly worded directive.  
Therefore, I argue that subjective individual threat perception, rather than “ objective” threat 
strength, is salient in driving psychological reactance.   
Reactance proneness is also referred to in the literature as “trait reactance”, and is a 
person’s inclination to distrust authority and resist persuasion (Dillard & Shen, 2005).  In this 
particular model, however, the emotion of interest is an employees’ reactance to specific 
monitoring programs, over and above their general inclination, which describes state reactance.  
Trait reactance is included in this model as a control variable and discussed more fully in 
Chapter Five.  
This study focuses on freedom of behavioral choice in the workplace, which makes for an 
interesting contrast to reactance studies in the fields of psychology or marketing.  Those contexts 
have generally studied people making decisions as individuals, with societal expectations being 
more or less the only limiting factor on behavioral choice.  In the context of an organization, 
despite the comparatively more structured environment, I assume the perceived freedom each 
individual has under the employment contract to be quite different.  I expect this to be true 
particularly in an autonomous work setting, where a higher number of tasks are accomplished 
more or less at the individual’s discretion, making them more prone to perceive perceived threats 
to behavioral freedom. 
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Therefore, I expect there to also be a range of reactance to different control measures.  
Some individuals may believe them to be just part of the job, while others may perceive a 
significant impact to personal freedoms, albeit at work.  This leads to the first hypothesis, which 
tests the relationship between elevated threat perception and a “reactance motivational state”: 
 H1:  Levels of threat perception of organizational control measures will be positively 
related to state reactance. 
 
 Plainly, reactance theory incorporates a large amount of individual subjectivity with 
regard to the perceived threat.  Beyond language, however, Brehm’s theory also suggests 
legitimacy and justification as two important variables that an individual will assess that might 
affect the level of reactance (1966).  In the fields of communication and marketing, the 
legitimacy of the message source might be an important variable to consider.  Individuals are 
generally studied in contexts with high behavioral choice and threats might come from a variety 
of sources with varying legitimacy.  With regard to organizational control practices, however, a 
certain level of authoritative legitimacy is presumed.  Possibly more importantly, the justification 
given by an organization for the control program might be perceived to have certain intentions, 
affecting employee behavioral reactions.   
In most cases, controls are put in place to improve the efficiency of processes in order to 
meet broader goals and objectives (Barker, 1993).  In business, this usually means an improved 
bottom-line and profitability, which indirectly benefits the employee, but may be systemically so 
far removed that it would be difficult for the individual employee to appreciate.  Another reason 
a control might be put in place is to promote safety within a process.  Although this might also be 
done by the organization with purely fiscal motives, the individual employee might see a more 
direct link between the control and personal well-being, moderating the level of reactance.   
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Autonomy has been shown to be a primary source of human morality, growth, 
development, health, well-being, and effectiveness at work (Jermier & Michaels, 2001).  Highly 
autonomous workers who are accustomed to these benefits might be more likely than employees 
who have low autonomy to actively investigate and interpret underlying justification for new 
control measures.  The level of reactance even to a high threat control program would then be 
lower if the organizational justification is related to something directly related to the employee 
well-being.  Justification type forms the basis of the second hypothesis:  
  
H2:  The relationship between the perceived threat of an organizational control measure 
and subsequent reactance is influenced by the perception that safety is the underlying purpose of 
the program, such that reactance will be lower for those individuals that have a higher 
perception of safety as the justification of the program. 
 
As previously discussed, reactance is theorized to be a motivational state that occurs 
when there is a perceived threat to behavioral freedom (Brehm & Brehm, 1981).  Just as 
important as determining the antecedents of reactance is determining the nature of individual 
reactions once this motivational state is reached.  The theory envisions that an individual might 
react to this threat by attempting to directly reestablish the freedom in question, while other 
reactions have also been theorized and tested that might indirectly quench this need for 
restoration.  Some examples of indirect behavior studied in the reactance research include 
increasing liking for the threatened choice (or behavior) (Brehm, Stires, Sensenig, & Shaban, 
1966), derogating the source of threat (Kohn & Barnes, 1977; Smith, 1977; Worchel, 1974), 
denying the existence of the threat (Worchel & Andreoli, 1974; Worchel, Andreoli, & Archer, 
1976), or by exercising a different freedom to regain the feeling of individual control (Wicklund, 
1974).  
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Resistance literature is characterized by ethnographic field studies that detail a broad and 
often unanticipated spectrum of ways in which resistance is displayed in organizations (Prasad & 
Prasad, 2000).  Individuals might develop a repertoire of resistant actions that lie outside the 
range of the control program which would allow the individual to recover their sense of 
autonomy.  These indirect resistant behaviors are at times evident to outside observers, such as 
an employee purposely parking in the wrong parking space to protest a more invasive monitoring 
program.  Many other behaviors, however, might be completely hidden and only discoverable 
upon disclosure from the employee.  These indirect and somewhat routine resistant behaviors 
would seem to be the easiest and most likely response to reactance.  Typologies of indirect 
resistance behaviors (i.e. Prasad & Prasad, 1998) are general and useful mainly in a qualitative 
sense.  I predict focused analysis of this specific context will show a positive relationship 
between reactance and indirect resistance behaviors. 
H3A:  Levels of psychological reactance (state) will be positively related to higher 
incidence of indirect resistant behaviors. 
As discussed, threats to autonomy from control programs that try to limit alternatives or 
force behavioral choice are likely to cause reactance.  In response to organizational control 
programs like electronic monitoring, individuals may perceive a threat to a range of behaviors, or 
stated differently, a threat to autonomy.  In an employment situation, it seems highly risky and 
therefore unlikely that an employee will attempt to directly reestablish the specific behaviors that 
have been targeted by a control program.  This could result in negative repercussions up to and 
including termination, which seems tolerable to only those employees with the very lowest 
attachment to their job.   
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While direct resistance by attempting to repeat a targeted behavior is unlikely, other 
reactions are possible.  One of the most intriguing instances might be the case when compliance 
with directives can actually become the basis of resistance.  Autonomous employees in highly 
complex environments who are relatively free to interpret company regulations and make 
decisions about the best way to accomplish tasks might be particularly likely to exercise this 
style of protest.  Employment contracts can be difficult to write because of uncertainty about 
future states and a lack of knowledge at the management level about specific processes 
(Williamson, 1975).  They are often incomplete, providing employees multiple “gray areas” of 
behavioral discretion (Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999).  In this case, abiding to the letter of the 
contract, or colloquially “work to rule” can actually be a highly effective resistance behavior.  
The autonomous worker is somewhat beyond reproach while potentially eliminating many of the 
extra-contractual behaviors that might have otherwise been advantageous to the company.  This 
“malicious compliance” might be best described as an indirect behavioral resistance in response 
to a perceived loss of autonomy.  I am interested in analyzing this behavior separately, however, 
so it is tested within a stand-alone hypothesis. 
 H3B:  Levels of psychological reactance (state) will be positively related to higher 
incidence of malicious compliance.  
 
 Early theoretical treatment of control in organizational studies was primarily informed by 
a somewhat macroeconomic analysis of what benefits a bureaucratic system provided over a 
market (Coase, 1937; Weber, 1958; Williamson, 1975).  As Organizational Behavior researchers 
began to open the “black box”, they noticed heterogeneity in individual attitudes and behaviors, 
even as structures and systems appeared to be similarly constructed and implemented across 
firms.  These differences in behavior strengthened the idea that organizations are multi-faceted, 
and the effect on individuals is correspondingly multiple and complex.   
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Beginning in the 1980s, theorists began to assess organizational aspects that seemed to 
guide these contextually unique individual behaviors.  In some ways, job enrichment and higher 
autonomy was an outcome of research that showed psychological benefits to individual workers 
(e.g. Hackman & Oldham, 1975).  Other reasons, however, included better technology available 
to the individual employee, a more educated workforce that was capable of a higher variety of 
tasks, and fiscal pressures related to employment costs.  Modern organizations felt the need to 
increase efficiency and operate on a thin “human resource margin.”  This multi-faceted 
employment expectation, created a control problem that could not be easily solved by traditional 
bureaucratic rules (Barker, 1993). 
Ray, addressing this so-called “crisis in bureaucratic control” whereby organizations 
could not seem to establish complete behavioral control through formal procedures, structure, 
and oversight, said the solution would be found in the organization’s culture (1986).  William 
Ouchi, in a seminal work on the subject, labeled this type of socialized effect “cult control” 
based on informal, value-laden relationships versus the formal rule structure of typical 
bureaucracies (1980).  Tompkins & Cheney, expanding on Edwards’ three traditional control 
strategies, used the term “concertive control” to describe this individually negotiated consensus 
of norms and ideals that help shape behavior for the overall organization (1985).   
Subtle differences in nomenclature aside, these ideas share the common theme that the 
locus of control was moving away from management toward the employees.  One mechanism 
through which individuals are thought to establish this type of self-control is identification with a 
group (e.g. Tajfel, et al., 1971).  Individuals self-categorize by internalizing the values, norms, 
and beliefs of the larger group and take them on as part of their social identity, particularly if 
they are beneficial to positive self-esteem (Turner, 1985).  To a certain extent, this process is 
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somewhat automatic and develops as a natural outcome of group membership.  In an 
organizational context, the perception of oneness where the individual defines himself through 
group membership is also called organizational identification (Mael & Ashforth, 1992).  
Organizational identification and self-categorization has been shown to then be a strong guide to 
attitudes and behavior (Tajfel & Turner, 1985; Mael & Ashforth, 1992).   
Identity theory says individuals are likely to have several identities, some of which are 
stronger and more central than others (Stryker & Burke, 2000).  In modern organizations, an 
individual can have several work-related identities, particularly those who might also be 
members of a profession or trade union (Foreman & Whetten, 2002).  These identities can be 
complementary, or in some cases, conflicting.  In many cases, the effectiveness of the 
socialization of the membership will determine the alignment of norms and values (i.e. identity), 
which has then been theorized to lead to innovation and spontaneous cooperation, among other 
beneficial behaviors (Feldman, 1981).  For relatively autonomous workers, in particular, 
structures and procedures can only be part of the control equation.  Those who do not share 
norms and values with the company might be expected to have different behavioral reactions to a 
loss of autonomy than those who do.  Each may experience similar reactance internally, but the 
strength of the identity with the source of the threat, which is in this case the company, might 
moderate behavioral outcomes.  This leads to the final hypotheses: 
 H4A:  The relationship between psychological reactance (state) and indirect resistance 
behaviors is influenced by the strength of identity with the company, such that those individuals 
who identify most with the company will display fewer resistant behaviors.   
 
H4B:  The relationship between psychological reactance (state) and malicious 
compliance is influenced by the strength of identity with the company, such that those individuals 
who identify most with the company will display lower malicious compliance. 
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Table 1 
Summary of Hypotheses 
H1:  Levels of threat perception of organizational control measures will be positively related to 
state reactance. 
H2:  The relationship between the perceived threat of an organizational control measure and 
subsequent reactance is influenced by the perception that safety is the underlying purpose of the 
program, such that reactance will be lower for those individuals that have a higher perception of 
safety as the justification of the program. 
 
H3A:  Levels of psychological reactance (state) will be positively related to higher incidence of 
indirect resistant behaviors. 
H3B:  Levels of psychological reactance (state) will be positively related to higher incidence of 
malicious compliance. 
H4A:  The relationship between psychological reactance (state) and indirect resistance 
behaviors is influenced by the strength of identity with the company, such that those individuals 
who identify most with the company will display fewer resistant behaviors. 
H4B:  The relationship between psychological reactance (state) and malicious compliance is 
influenced by the strength of identity with the company, such that those individuals who identify 
most with the company will display lower malicious compliance. 
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Chapter Four 
Research Methodology and Measures 
As noted in the resistance literature, it is particularly difficult to observe and identify 
resistant behaviors without knowing underlying intent.  Many behaviors that are classified as 
“resistant” might be innocent mistakes, while other behaviors that seem completely innocuous 
might actually be intentionally resistant (Prasad & Prasad, 2000).  Additionally, workers who 
operate in complex environments create challenges because an observer would have to be highly 
knowledgeable of the environment and worker actions.  Because of these difficulties, workers 
who are relatively autonomous have been understudied in the resistance literature.  In order to 
shorten this research gap, I decided to study commercial airline pilots.  I believe commercial 
airline pilots to be an appropriate representative sample of the overall population of “autonomous 
workers” who also have the requisite monitoring for this research.  Pilots operate in a highly 
monitored and controlled environment, but also require a high amount of judgment under 
uncertainty, evaluation of multiple courses of action, and individual decision-making, especially 
once the aircraft has departed the terminal.  The “pilot-in-command” concept stems from the 
tradition of maritime ship captaincy, and relies on the individuals in control of the vessel to make 
use of their own judgment in unique circumstances.   
I utilized a two-stage data collection in an attempt to overcome some of the difficulties in 
identifying the behaviors of interest.  The qualitative first stage involved in-depth interviews with 
representatives of the proposed sample in order to better understand existing control programs 
and potential resistant behaviors.  The information gained in the interviews helped ground the 
proposed measures and reinforces the theoretical propositions.  The second stage was a survey to 
gather data to test the stated hypotheses.  Before discussing the specific results, it seems helpful 
to provide an overview of the main job tasks accomplished by a pilot and where autonomy and 
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decision discretion might be encountered.  Following this overview, I discuss results of the two 
stages of data collection.   
The qualitative interviews provided excellent insight into the world of commercial 
aviation, and inform the next few pages where I examine the context more thoroughly.  While 
pilots enjoy a great deal of autonomy, their environment is also tightly controlled and regulated.  
There are three active programs that monitor, measure, and report pilot behavior in the cockpit:  
The Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) and the Flight Data Recorder (FDR) (together the “black 
boxes”), Flight Officer Quality Assurance (FOQA), and the Aircraft Communications 
Addressing and Reporting System (ACARS) automated reporting.  Video monitoring is being 
proposed as a monitoring tool, particularly after a recent incident involving pilots who overflew 
their destination, as well as other well-publicized behavioral anomalies.   
 In order to provide a degree of understanding of the context of interest, the following 
describes a typical day in the life of a commercial airline pilot.  To begin with, a pilot will be 
awarded a schedule for the month which can be a fixed schedule of point-to-point flights (called 
a “line”) or a “reserve line” which has specific days that the pilot is on call and may be scheduled 
as needed.  All types of aircraft currently flown by this particular airline have two pilots on 
board, a Captain and a First Officer.  The Captain is vested with command authority during the 
flight, which means he or she will be the final decision-maker in regard to the conduct of the 
flight.  Training emphasizes involvement and assertiveness from the First Officer, which intends 
to ensure the Captain has important information from other sources when making decisions.   
 Depending on the aircraft type, pilots may fly one flight in large aircraft or possibly two 
or even three flights in smaller, domestic aircraft.  The pilots usually meet 2 hours prior to 
takeoff time for the first flight of the day.  A dispatcher, who is normally based in a fixed, 
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separate location, has done some of the early planning and shares responsibility of final planning 
and execution of the flight with the pilots.  During this meeting, the pilots will discuss weather, 
the route of flight, fuel planning, and any notices that might impact their flight.  They have 
several decisions to make, including accepting the dispatchers recommended routing and fuel 
load.  Once the preflight briefing is complete, the pilots go to the gate to speak with the agents 
there about the passenger load and any other issues.  They proceed to the aircraft where the First 
Officer usually does an exterior inspection of the aircraft while the Captain briefs the flight 
attendants on the details of the flight.   
 When the plane is loaded, the gate agent pulls the jetway back and the flight attendants 
close the aircraft door.  The pilots then coordinate with the maintenance personnel on the ground 
for “pushback” away from the gate.  The release of the parking brake to allow the tug to push the 
aircraft is a measured event recorded and reported by the ACARS system.  This is the 
“departure” metric that is aggregated and reported to various internal and external agencies, 
including the FAA.  Once the flight is airborne, the Captain has authority over how the flight is 
conducted.  In general, the flight is expected to be flown at the speed, altitude, and route 
specified in the flight plan, which is optimized primarily for fuel efficiency but also ensures the 
expected enroute time.  Sometimes the Captain will choose to deviate from the plan, for reasons 
such as weather, unexpected winds, turbulence, or other aircraft traffic.   
 These areas of operational discretion are where the opportunity exists for the primary 
behavior of interest.  Malicious Compliance is the intentional withholding of behaviors and 
actions that might be operationally beneficial but are outside of the employment contract.  In the 
context of commercial aviation, safety is paramount and the well-being of the passengers and 
crew dictate many decisions.  There is inherent risk in operating an aircraft, however, and pilots 
  
42 
use a variety of techniques to mitigate these risks.  Decisions are made to meet certain safety 
standards for the operation of the aircraft.  Once this level is met, however, there are many times 
pilots have some discretion as to how and where the aircraft is flown.  On the ground, for 
instance, an aircraft may not have all systems functioning for the flight.  Unless that piece of 
equipment is specifically listed in a manual as being necessary for flight, the Captain (with input 
from the First Officer, maintenance, and dispatch) has the choice to proceed with the flight or 
not.  Once the flight is airborne, other decisions about the altitude, the speed, and the route of 
flight can all affect how efficiently the aircraft goes from one place to another.  Unless 
contractually obligated, these decisions reflect the autonomy and discretion pilots have that can 
impressively impact not only an airline’s operational performance metrics, but also its financial 
performance.   
 Surveillance systems and programs are functioning once the aircraft is powered at the 
gate.  The CVR captures voices in the cockpit for a certain duration (typically 30 minutes), then 
records over in a loop.  The FDR captures aircraft performance such as speed, attitude, and 
altitude.  As mentioned, these are the “black boxes” which are retrieved and analyzed after a 
safety incident.  These devices are supposed to only be used by safety specialists in response to 
an incident, and the data kept within safety channels only to prevent further similar accidents.  
There have been times, however, that data has been released to the public, which might affect 
how well pilots trust the process and subsequent behavioral patterns.  With this context in mind, I 
summarize the data collection strategies below. 
Qualitative interviews.  I interviewed members of the target population (commercial 
airline pilots) in order to more fully comprehend individual perceptions of specific control 
systems and actual workplace reactions.  These interviews also helped refine the survey 
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instrument, particularly those measuring the dependent variables, malicious compliance and 
indirect resistant behaviors.  A difficulty in qualitative research is determining a sample size that 
will be suitably informative while not overly time-consuming.  Many factors affect when 
saturation can occur, including type of research, participant expertise, and the ultimate aims of 
the study (Mason, 2010).  Recent research by Guest, Bunce, & Johnson (2006) showed saturation 
occurred within the first twelve interviews, although metathemes were present in as early as six 
interviews.  Other research regarding phenomenology recommends a similar sample size:  five to 
twenty-five (Creswell, 1998), and at least six (Morse, 1994).   
Following this research, I interviewed nineteen individuals using a semi-structured 
interview guide (Appendix A).  After ten interviews, repeating themes were apparent, and at 
nineteen interviews no new or unique insights or behaviors in regard to the monitoring systems 
had emerged.  I assumed I had achieved behavioral saturation at this point.  The interviews 
illuminated many facets of day-to-day exposure to aircraft control systems, and subsequent pilot 
behaviors and reactions.  To summarize the results of the interviews, I aggregate particularly 
enlightening answers to specific questions from the interview guide. 
1. Tell me about your background in commercial aviation. 
a. Length of time, different airlines or unions, aircraft flown, schedule and routes, 
current aircraft and qualifications 
 
The nineteen interviews included eight Captains and eleven First Officers of which 
seventeen were male and two female.  Most were hired in the 1990s with a few in the 1980s.  
The average time of employment for the interview group is fifteen years.  Thirteen participants 
had military flight training and experience, and then joined this airline immediately.  The 
remaining six had civilian training and flew for various regional airlines before joining this 
airline.  All current equipment types are represented, 757, 767, 777, and the Airbus 319/320 with 
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the modal equipment being the Airbus (ten pilots).  The 727 and 737 are also represented, 
although they are not currently being flown by the airline. In summary, the group was fairly 
representative of the overall target sample, while being somewhat overrepresented by military 
background and male gender. 
2. Are you aware of any control systems while you are operating the aircraft? 
 
There were various levels of awareness among different crewmembers.  Most mentioned 
the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR), the Flight Data Recorder (FDR), and Flight Officer Quality 
Assurance (FOQA) immediately.  When I mentioned the Aircraft Communications Addressing 
and Reporting System (ACARS), all respondents agreed that it is a monitoring system (for its 
time reporting function), but in general most thought of it initially as a communication device.  
The Line Operations Safety Audit (LOSA) program was not initially mentioned as a “control 
system” and this could be for a few reasons.  First, it is a program in which another person is the 
monitor, which makes it unique among the surveillance programs.  Second, it is a program in its 
infancy, and very few pilots have been exposed to it on a first-hand basis.   
3. Describe your experience with the following programs: 
a. LOSA  
i. Have you ever been asked to participate in the LOSA program?   
None of my interview subjects had been asked to allow a LOSA observer on their 
flight.   
1. Number of times? N/A 
ii. Describe your experience:  N/A 
 
iii. Have you refused a LOSA observer?  Why?   
Although this question didn’t apply to any of my subjects, I asked if they 
would refuse a LOSA observer, if requested.  A majority (13/19) indicated they 
would not refuse.  The other six said (generally) that there was not enough 
information provided by the union/company about the program for them to trust 
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the process, and provided no new information was made available they would 
lean toward refusal. 
iv. Have you seen another pilot refuse a LOSA observer?  Do you know 
why?  None 
 
b. FOQA:  All aircraft at this airline are equipped with this data collection and 
reporting system.  There is no way for a pilot to deactivate the system from 
the cockpit.   
There was a high level of knowledge and awareness of the FOQA system 
among all respondents.  Some typical comments include: 
1. “its there all the time, whether you want it or not.” 
2. “Big Brother is watching” 
3. “FOQA affects the training program” 
4. “(FOQA)…always in the back of your mind” 
5. “affects how I fly” 
6. “data would be used against me” 
7. “electronic watchdog” 
8. “used to single out cowboys” 
 
i. How have you seen FOQA data being used?  Who uses it and how 
(chief pilots, safety, etc)?   
 
Generally, all subjects were aware of different situations where a crew was 
admonished or otherwise disciplined by their domicile flight managers for flying 
outside of Standard Operating Procedure.  Some used the term “FOQA tag” to 
indicate when a maneuver exceeded SOP criteria and the system highlighted the 
event.  Generally, the subjects said if they had any doubt that a maneuver they had 
performed would be flagged by FOQA, they would report it using the airline’s 
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safety reporting system1.  This action would provide some level of immunity from 
punishment, if the discrepancy was not overly egregious.   
Pilots (representing the union) and management personnel make up a 
FOQA Monitoring Team (FMT) whose job it is to identify and track data.  A few 
pilots are also “gatekeepers” who are the few who can link abnormal data to 
specific crewmembers2.  The FMT looks for single anomalies or trends across the 
data, and report these findings to flight managers at respective domiciles and to 
fleet managers at the pilot training center.  The trend information is disseminated 
to the pilots via written notice and/or added to the training program during annual 
simulator refresher training.  I found the majority of the subjects to be fairly 
matter-of-fact about the system itself, but definitely somewhat uneasy that their 
aircraft performance was constantly being monitored.  
ii. Have you ever heard of anyone being singled out using data from this 
system? Was it for punishment, rewards, other purposes? 
 
The inclusion of “rewards” in this question was met with more than one 
chuckle.  I learned that rewards are generally given to employee groups as a 
whole (on time performance, profit sharing, etc) and not to individuals.  There are 
occasional times when crews are given awards for outstanding airmanship, in 
which case the FOQA data might be used to validate the crew’s actions.   
More commonly, respondents were keenly aware of stories about crews 
who had been contacted to explain deviations flagged by FOQA.  It seemed like 
the informal communication network among pilots is a very effective way to                                                         1 This process, known as the Flight Safety Awareness Program (FSAP), allows pilots to report unusual situations that might affect safety of flight.  Reporting an incident  2   The “gatekeepers” of the FOQA system are assigned by each domicile chief pilot and have the responsibility to represent union pilots on the FMT, but also can identify specific crewmembers if the need arises. 
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disseminate “what not to do” based on a FOQA tag.  One respondent knew of a 
crew that was called in for being 50 knots above profile on a landing (which is 
significantly fast).  They were asked about extenuating circumstances and told 
they were “on probation” for a certain amount of time.  Another crew had 
momentarily flown too fast for the flap setting.  Several subjects mentioned “hard 
landings” as being commonly tagged by FOQA, but not commonly reported by 
crews because it is fairly subjective from a pilot perspective.   
While telling about other crews who had been “tagged” it was obvious that 
the subjects thought it was very important for evaluators to establish the context 
as closely as possible when something happens.  It is difficult to take raw data and 
retrospectively try to create an accurate account, to include the exact 
environmental cues, and this worried the subjects.  This desire for accurate 
context was often mentioned as a reason to proactively fill out a safety report, as 
mentioned above.  It was also evident that the subjects I interviewed were 
concerned about procedural fairness if they were flagged by FOQA.  The criteria 
(SOP) weren’t singled out as being overly stringent or difficult to achieve, but 
there was concern about the ability of the reviewers to independently and 
objectively use the data.  This was also cited as a concern and addressed 
consistently in the video monitoring discussion. 
Nearly all respondents (17/19) talked about how FOQA is incorporated 
into the training program.  If the data is aggregated and certain trends emerge, the 
training managers are notified and feedback is given to crews that come through 
for either initial or recurrent training.  This was seen as a positive aspect of the 
  
48 
program.  The pilots appreciated being able to practice in situations where other 
crews in real time exceeded some operating criteria or put themselves in an 
unfavorable situation.  
c. CVR/FDR:  Current SOP has the pilots turn these systems on 5 minutes prior 
to engine start and they stay on until the aircraft is shut down at the arrival 
gate.  
 
i. Have you ever seen anyone disable or otherwise manipulate this 
system?  Describe the circumstances.   
 
Five respondents said they have seen or been part of a crew intentionally 
disabled the CVR, but exclusively on the 727 which had older technology and a 
circuit breaker that could easily be pulled.  These actions seemed to be single 
occurrences and appear to be difficult to do in current aircraft.  Three of the 
subjects felt the CVR and FDR might provide beneficial information in an 
accident that might support the crew.  Most, however, did not trust the process to 
keep this data in the hands of safety professionals only.  One respondent told a 
story about a crewmember saying, “I don’t agree with this decision” loud enough 
to be recorded.  It was likely said in jest, but this highlights the extent of the 
awareness crews have about their monitoring systems.   
Most (13/19) of the interviews included some type of reference to an 
accident or incident when CVR/FDR data had been leaked to the press.  In 
particular, the recent Colgan Air crash near Buffalo was cited seven times.  This 
again reflects one of the largest concerns with these monitoring systems…that the 
data or information will be released outside of safety channels to the public at-
large, who could form their own reality without other situationally-specific cues 
or knowledge. 
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d. ACARS automated reporting:  This system reports “OOOI” data or Out (brake 
release and cabin door shut), Off (takeoff), On (land), and In (parking brake 
set at the gate). 
 
i. Have you ever seen anyone disable or override this system?  
Describe the circumstances.  
  
There were two types of motivation for this action.  First, two subjects 
describe situations where the parking brake could be released early to fool the 
system into reporting the “Out.”  This was done to show the aircraft had departed 
the gate, which started the “clock” for pay purposes.  Alternatively, and more in 
line with my model, fifteen of the subjects have seen some type of manipulation 
of this system to erroneously report a time that would negatively impact the 
metrics used by the company and the FAA to assess operational performance.  
This seems to be a clear resistance behavior done to harm the organization. 
4. What is your assessment of the benefits and shortcomings of these systems? 
a. FOQA 
Benefits:   
 Prevents “normalization of deviance” 
 Fewer people outside of Standard Operating Procedures 
 Direct feedback to incorporate into recurrent training 
Shortcomings: 
 Does not provide overall context 
 Focus on preventing “tags” instead of flying aircraft 
 Makes crews more reactive vs. proactive 
 
b. LOSA 
Benefits 
 Signals that safety is more important than operations 
Shortcomings: 
 Very little education about the program 
 
c. CVR/FDR  
Benefits 
 Valuable in safety investigations 
Shortcomings: 
 Data that is supposed to be safeguarded released to public 
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d. ACARS   
Benefits 
 Automated accounting of times.  Close to eliminating human error, 
but there are creative ways to override 
Shortcomings: 
 Provides very limited information across communication channels; 
full context not available for deviations 
 
5. What are some of the behavioral reactions you have seen from pilots relating to these 
systems or programs? 
 
Some of these have been covered when discussing the specific systems.  
Overall, the subjects gave me the perception that they are very aware of being 
monitored.  While most have accepted their fate in a way and just do their job as 
best they can, I also got the feeling that they have changed the way they operate, 
to a degree.  The Captain of the aircraft has quite a bit of decision authority when 
the aircraft is airborne, which is a legacy of the tradition of maritime ship 
captaincy.  My impression from the Captains I interviewed was that they are very 
likely to seek other sources of information and guidance, like maintenance or the 
flight dispatcher (who is an operational expert, but generally not a pilot), when a 
decision falls in a gray area.  Even with outside approval, many subjects still said 
they would be likely to refuse an aircraft that had inoperative systems (but still 
deemed by maintenance as safe to fly) or be more inclined to divert to a 
maintenance airport if airborne.  This is indicative of a change from a generation 
of pilots ago, when the Captain rarely asked anyone’s opinion, even the pilot 
sitting next to him.  I believe this revelation of seeking external validation or 
approval for decisions reinforces my assertion that while monitoring has benefits 
(enforcing SOP compliance), it also has some second-order effects, including 
intentional behavioral reactions that limit productivity. 
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6. Do you have any opinion about video monitors being placed in the cockpit?  Pros and 
cons?  What concerns you?  
 
This question, as expected, brought out strong opinions, but I also 
observed some variance which was a little surprising.  Most said that their initial 
reaction was to oppose it, for a variety of reasons including privacy, dignity, 
personal space, and doubts that it would provide any better information than was 
already available.  Once I described that it might be used just for safety purposes, 
like the CVR or FDR, and it would be a wide-angle, rear-aspect view of the pilots, 
opposition relaxed somewhat and the discussion became more focused on how the 
data would be used.   
Pros:  I would say none of my subjects gave a potential video system a 
“pro.”  The common theme was, “if management and the union say it has to be 
there, then I’ll just live with it.” 
Cons:  The potential for real-time playback (somewhere), the potential 
misuse of the captured data (for other than safety reasons), the lack of 
dignity/privacy for the family in the case of an accident (i.e. public release). 
A common critique (and the biggest concern):  If the system has the 
requisite low fidelity to address privacy concerns, then it compromises the high 
fidelity required to obtain the necessary context to make accurate assessments and 
decisions about a crew’s performance.   
7. Have you ever seen other pilots intentionally withhold behavior that might have been 
good for the operation but was outside of contractual obligations?  Have you ever 
experienced this situation?  Why did you choose your course of action? 
 
This behavior was widely acknowledged by all subjects, and twelve gave 
examples.  One general theme is that there is some discretion by the pilots as to 
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what type of equipment on the aircraft must be operable to accomplish the 
particular flight.  Many dynamic factors are involved in the decision, including 
weather, fatigue, passenger load, and more.  In general, the pilots have resorted to 
the principal of the “most conservative response” because they are concerned 
about being second-guessed by supervisors.  The most conservative response is 
sometimes appropriate, but can also be limiting when conditions might allow the 
acceptance of more risk.   
One Captain described himself as being more reactive vs. proactive, as 
monitoring has become more prevalent.  Another first officer described how he 
used to help the baggage guys out by carrying the gate checked items down the 
jetway to the plane when he would go down for his exterior inspection.  Now he 
doesn’t do that because he’ll get tagged with a late if they are even one minute 
over push time.  A First Officer recently successfully lobbied his Captain to turn 
down an aircraft because of an inoperative bathroom.  The flight was only two 
hours and it was legal to fly the aircraft, but with a full plane, they did not want to 
be second-guessed if something happened where they might be on the tarmac for 
an extended period.   
 
Summary.  It is fairly evident from the interviews that the pilots are aware of the 
monitoring systems in the cockpit, particularly the FOQA program and the ACARS time 
reporting.  The CVR/FDR are somewhat accepted as part of the job, but recent accidents and the 
perceived inappropriate disclosure of data outside of safety channels give pilots an uneasy 
feeling about how they might be used.  It appears that LOSA is not widely acknowledged as a 
control or monitoring system.  Although most pilots are aware of the program, there are very few 
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to date who have participated or been asked to participate.  While the human monitoring 
variation is an interesting component to this program, I do not believe there is enough experience 
among the subjects to draw meaningful conclusions. 
I also asked about indirect resistant behaviors, which I define as behavior not directly 
related to safely operating the aircraft.  Initially, most subjects focused only on behavior in the 
aircraft.  Reactance theory predicts that there are direct and indirect responses to the loss of 
individual freedom.  Direct responses might include disabling the systems, or simply ignoring 
them and accepting the consequences.   
The interview subjects indicated some indirect behaviors, and these could be placed into 
three major categories:  scheduling (including flying overtime, use of sick call, etc), appearance, 
and intentionally slowing down to alter performance measures.  Scheduling behaviors might 
include being unwilling to waive or come close to a flying hour limit in order to accept an 
assignment, using sick time to avoid an assignment, or being unwilling to pick up open trips even 
if it is a personal financial benefit.  This sticker from a web forum reflects this attitude. 
  
Subjects also said they showed resistance by altering their appearance.  An airline pilot 
uniform is an important and distinct signal of professionalism.  Most (15/19) of my subjects said 
they no longer wear their hats as a sign of unhappiness with work conditions.  Other resistant 
behaviors associated with appearance might be to grow hair or moustaches longer, not shine 
shoes regularly, or just generally wear the uniform improperly (including union pins or other 
badges).  This aligns with reactance theory which predicts individuals will find alternate avenues 
of self-expression and control if it is not practical to directly challenge an eliminated behavioral 
option.  
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Many subjects indicated they have seen examples of slowing down or what seemed like 
intentional sabotage of a company metric.  Although none claimed to have done this 
individually, I believe the responses provide enough support to ask this question to the sample as 
a whole. 
Based on the interview results, I made the following changes to the survey. 
1. Eliminated LOSA as a control system due to lack of pilot exposure. 
2. Combined behavioral reactions in one matrix-style assessment with larger range 
of answers (not a dichotomous yes/no). 
3. Expanded the response range scale on most measures to six points instead of four.   
Survey methodology and sample.  I used a single-wave survey to obtain data in 
support of this study (Appendix B).  I initially conducted a pilot-test of the survey 
instrument, selecting thirty respondents from the proposed population.  The results of the 
pilot test generally supported the model.  Additionally, three of these respondents agreed to 
take the survey using a think-aloud format.  The basic concept in a think-aloud survey review is 
for the respondent to read a question aloud, and then verbalize internal thought processes 
concerning the questions and answers (Sudman, Bradburn, & Schwartz, 1995).  This allowed me 
to fine tune the instrument using direct input from members of the proposed population.  In 
general, feedback about the survey was positive, with the structure being fairly simple and easy 
to understand.  The pilot test and specific comments resulted in changes to the instrument itself: 
1. For the ACARS system, I specified the automatic time reporting function.  Many 
of the ACARS other functions are not related to monitoring and therefore were 
not within the scope of this study. 
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2. I established consistency in scale response range from left to right (some scales 
started with “strongly agree” on the left-most column, and some started with 
“strongly disagree”). 
3. The dependent variables measure what is presumed to be low base-rate behaviors.  
Given this, I expanded the infrequent end of the response range and eliminated the 
high-frequency answer “always.”  
4. Respondents showed some difficulty narrowing down the answer to “who does 
this system benefit the most?” to either the individual or the company.  All think-
aloud respondents wanted other options for the answer, and two became focused 
on the presumption that what is good for the company might also be good for the 
individual.  Basically, the question caused confusion and I removed it from the 
final version.    
The main variables included in the hypotheses are individual-level perceptions and 
behaviors.  Surveys are well suited to gather this type of primary data, because the 
instrument can be tailored to ask specific questions, making the data more reflective of the 
exact research question (Wilson, 2005).  There are also drawbacks to surveys, including 
potentially low response rates, bias introduced by inappropriate item wording, and reliance 
on individuals to accurately self-report.  In this study, however, gathering first-hand primary 
data that might otherwise be difficult to measure seems to outweigh the potential costs.  A 
well-constructed survey instrument can be an efficient and relatively reliable way to 
determine underlying intention.  It can also mitigate “observer-expectancy effect” whereby a 
researcher might influence the behavior of subjects as well as misinterpret, misidentify, or 
overlook certain behaviors of interest.  
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The difficulty in measuring resistant behavior became immediately apparent as I 
coordinated the administration of the survey to my target population.  I had previously 
contacted the union representing the pilots well in advance and asked for their assistance in 
sending a survey to their membership regarding monitoring and behavioral reactions.  The 
union was supportive and interested in my research.  As the time to administer the survey 
grew nearer, I sent the actual survey with a link to the union representatives.  They reviewed 
the survey and felt it was too sensitive and they did not want to be associated with the 
content.  In their defense, there were unusual circumstances with this particular company 
happening at the time I proposed to do the survey, which made all parties suspicious and 
very cautious about anything with potentially negative perceptions.  The union declined to 
support the study, but did not explicitly ask me to stop my research.  
My strategy then shifted to a web forum administered and populated by pilots for this 
particular company.  I had been following this forum as part of my effort to better understand 
the attitudes and behaviors of pilots, and I thought it would make an excellent controlled 
subsample of my target population.  There were approximately 975 members of the forum at 
the time of the study and the administrators, who require employment validation to join, 
strictly control membership.  All domiciles were represented with a mix of Captains and First 
Officers.  I obtained prior approval from the administrators, then posted a short explanation 
and a link to the survey.  I included statements containing elements of verbal consent, 
emphasizing the anonymity of the participants and that no individual data would be disclosed 
to the company or the union.  The request to participate was kept on the forum for fourteen 
days.   
  
57 
The web forum proved to be relatively uncharted territory as a research tool, and 
provided unique opportunities as well as some challenges.  Since I had the ability to post 
items as an insider, I presumed that there would be a certain level of trust and most would 
take the survey without too much hesitation.  Almost immediately, however, a person 
responded publicly on the forum and questioned the nature of the research and doubted that I 
was a pilot.  Another post asked me to provide any affiliation to the company, any affiliation 
to a private company that provided electronic monitoring devices, all sources of funding, and 
my hypotheses.  Thinking my research was coming to a sudden death, I responded by 
providing as much detail as I could without divulging the specific hypotheses, and trying to 
minimize any bias I might introduce by explaining too much of the research program.  Once 
I did this, several members took the survey and responded that they had done so and 
supported my research.  Ultimately, a negative aspect of the forum was that it provided a 
public venue for complaints and suspicion about the survey, which are usually private 
thoughts for anonymous survey respondents.  On the other hand, it gave me the ability to 
reassure potential survey respondents, and let other members of the population make 
supportive statements as well.   
After the survey duration, there were 217 complete responses and 27 incomplete 
responses.  I calculated a sample size of 698 based on the number of discrete “views” of the 
thread, which the forum tracked.  A view was logged when a forum member clicked on the 
topic heading, which was labeled “research on cockpit monitoring”.  This opened the thread 
with the link to participate in the survey.  In consideration of the complete responses and 
using the number of views as the number of eligible respondents, the overall response rate is 
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217/698, or 31.1%.  This response rate is in the range of what is considered an acceptable 
representation of the sample in social science (Sapsford, 1999).   
Demographic analysis of the respondents shows appropriate representation across 
variables.  The following table shows demographic variables for the respondent group 
compared to the pilot population of the specific company.  
Table 2  
Variable Respondents Population T-Test 
Crew Position (Capt/First Officer) 83/134 (38.2% Captains) 3009/4658 (39.2% Capts) p = .06 
Gender (Male/Female) 177/40 (81.6% Male) 6557/1110 (85.5% Male) p = .09 
Background (Military/Civilian) 103/114 (47.5% Military) unknown n/a 
Ever furloughed 59/217 (26.3%) 2172/7667 (28.3%) p = .79 
Age 30-39 (5.5%), 40-49 
(48.4%), 50-59 (36.9%), 
60-above (9.2%) 
unknown n/a 
 
There is limited information available from the company or the union concerning the 
demographic makeup of the pilots.  I was able to obtain the Captain to First Officer ratio and 
the number of pilots furloughed from union information.  The company provided the gender 
breakdown.  Using a one-sample t-test at 95% confidence, I did not find significant 
differences between the respondent group and the population for the known variables.  In the 
case of crew position, raw data suggests a slightly lower representation of Captains and a 
lower percentage of males.  While I cannot statistically conclude there are no differences in 
background, the raw data shows a nearly even split between military and civilian.  This is an 
expected ratio based on my qualitative interviews and knowledge of the pilot workforce, in 
general.  Age, as well, cannot be statistically conclusive, but appears to be distributed in an 
expected manner across age groups. 
While an n of 217 is a lower total response than I had programmed in my original 
sample strategy, it still provides an acceptable amount of power.  Assuming the most 
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conservative small effect size of .03 (Cohen, 1977), the model produces a power of 
approximately .94, which is the probability of correctly rejecting the null hypotheses at a 5% 
level of confidence.   
Measures 
 In this section, I provide specific measures for each variable as well as response 
scales and any recoding that was necessary.  I then provide descriptive statistics and results 
of the specific hypothesis tests.  The final analysis is a single factor test to determine the 
extent of common method bias. 
Dependent Variables 
Resistant Behaviors.  The dependent variable(s) in this study are the resistant behaviors 
that I predict will result from state reactance to organizational control.  In keeping with previous 
discussion, I measured both indirect behaviors and malicious compliance.   
The first dependent variable, which I label “indirect resistance,” is derived from 
measuring six different behaviors with answers based on frequency of occurrence, using the 
following scale: 
1—Never 
2—Rarely 
3—Sometimes 
4—Often 
5—Nearly always 
 
These indirect resistant behaviors, developed in part and refined through the qualitative 
interviews, reflect activities that are not a direct challenge to specific monitoring systems.  For 
example, the survey asked, (how often have you) “Intentionally disregarded dress and 
appearance standards (e.g. no hat)?”  Initially, this measure consisted of seven items.  But one 
item, which asked if a pilot wore their union pin incorrectly, negatively impacted the reliability 
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of the scale.  The mean of this item was 1.34, which places the average respondent squarely 
between “never” and “rarely” on the scale.  The item just previous to this on the survey asked 
more generally about incorrect wear of the uniform, which I believe captured this behavior.  The 
Cronbach’s Alpha for the measure with the union pin question included was .64.  Without this 
item, the Alpha improves to .75, which seems very good considering the scale measures 
behaviors that seem on the surface to be unrelated.  Based on the low level of occurrence and 
impression that this behavior is captured in a different item, I eliminated the union pin question 
from the measure.  The remaining six items are listed below: 
How often have you: 
1. Slowed down to intentionally miss a metric? 
2. Ignored calls from the scheduling desk? 
3. Called in sick when not actually sick? 
4. Intentionally disregarded dress and appearance standards (e.g. no hat)? 
5. Reduced effort and quality in job areas not under direct surveillance? 
6. Placed a sticker on your fight bag displaying displeasure? For example: "No waivers, 
no favors, I follow the contract". 
 
The second dependent variable is “malicious compliance”, which I define as intentionally 
and willfully withholding an action that is presumed to be "operationally beneficial", but is not 
specifically part of an employee’s contracted duties.  Operationally beneficial can have different 
meanings in different environments.  In the context of this research, I define it as:  Over and 
above flying the aircraft safely, a pilot has a range of discretionary actions that might yield 
higher completion rates or increase efficiency of the operation ("operationally beneficial").  This 
variable was measured in a single item by first providing the definition, then asking a frequency 
for this behavior: 
Over and above flying the aircraft safely, a pilot has a range of discretionary actions that 
might yield higher completion rates or increase efficiency of the operation ("operationally 
beneficial").   For instance, a Captain might decide to fly an aircraft with a mechanical writeup 
for a system (e.g. the APU) that is not necessarily required for the flight.  Or a First Officer 
might hustle some gate checked bags down to the baggage hold.  How often have you 
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intentionally withheld an action that might have been "operationally beneficial," but was not 
specifically part of your contracted duties? 
• Never (1) 
• Rarely (2) 
• Sometimes (3) 
• Often (4) 
• Nearly Always (5) 
 
While not a theorized dependent variable, I also measured “direct resistance,” which were 
different behaviors associated with each monitoring system.  Each direct behavior is in reaction 
to each specific system, and in general has to do with tricking or bypassing the system.  For 
example, the survey asked, (how often have you) “Intentionally caused the ACARS to make an 
erroneous report (e.g. to indicate a late pushback when actually on time)?”   The qualitative 
interviews reinforced the occurrence of these behaviors, as well as eliminating one direct 
behavior, turning the system off.  In some cases, there were reports of pilots simply turning a 
monitoring system off (or removing power by pulling a circuit breaker).  The interviewees were 
unanimous in saying this no longer happens, as aircraft modernization has made this nearly 
impossible.  As discussed in Chapter 3, I did not theorize a relationship to direct resistance, but 
did gather data to measure the behavior.  The items from the survey are: 
How often have you: 
1. Intentionally caused the ACARS to make an erroneous report (e.g. to indicate a late 
pushback when actually on time) 
2. Filed a (pilot report) simply to "cover" for a potential "FOQA tag" 
3. Sought out more advice than necessary during an unusual situation that might be 
"FOQA tagged" 
4. Said something for the CVR to record (e.g. "I don't agree with this course of action")  
 
The survey results also support the omission of direct resistance as a typical behavior, 
with means of 1.55, 1.57, and 1.17, respectively for direct behaviors related to ACARS, FOQA, 
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and the Black Boxes.  The response scale is coded as “1-never” and “2-rarely”, which reinforces 
the sentiment related in the interviews.   
A factor analysis of the items in the dependent variable measures is described below.  
The initial solution resulted in three components with eigenvalues over 1.0, with the third being 
just slightly so.  Reactance theory, however, predicts that there are two general types of behavior, 
indirect and direct (Brehm, 1966).  I structured the behaviors in this research to align with this 
theoretical assumption, and there are several items that I believe are indirect and others that I 
categorize as direct.  I categorize malicious compliance as an indirect behavior, and direct 
behaviors are the previously described system specific behaviors.  In keeping with this 
theorization, I ran a factor analysis, forcing a solution of two factors (Table 3).  
 
In order to improve interpretation I used a promax rotation with Kaiser normalization, 
which is an oblique rotation.  I selected this rotation in lieu of an orthogonal rotation (e.g. 
varimax) because the latter presumes relative independence among the individual items.  In this 
research, I believe the items have underlying correlation to a degree, some highly so.  An oblique 
rotation is the preferred method under these circumstances.  The results of this analysis show 
relative support for the combination of items measuring indirect resistance behaviors on the first 
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factor, with the four direct resistance behavior items loading the least, and all items I classify as 
indirect behaviors loading at .311 and above. 
The second factor is more difficult to interpret, but the three of the four direct resistance 
items load at .529 and above, with the remaining direct item loading at .370.  Two of the indirect 
items load above .300, and are the indirect items that have the most “operational” feel.  The first 
item asks about slowing down to intentionally miss a metric, and the second addresses reduced 
effort and quality in job areas not under direct surveillance.  Ultimately, information from the 
qualitative interviews combined with this analysis reinforces the combination of the indirect 
resistance behavior items as one variable. 
Independent Variables 
Perception of threat to freedom.  The first variable in the model is the perception of 
threat to a behavioral freedom in relation to one of the three control programs currently present 
in the cockpits of the airline being studied.  This measure was used for all three systems and 
determines the degree to which an individual perceives a behavioral freedom is threatened or 
possibly already removed.  The scale is based on a previously developed scale that measured the 
threat from a message (Dillard & Shen, 2005): 
1.  {This program (e.g. The Cockpit Voice Recorder)} threatens my freedom to perform  
my job as I see fit. 
2.  {This program} makes decisions for me. 
3.  {This program} manipulates the way I perform my job. 
4.  {This program} pressures me to modify my on the job behavior. 
 
Original Scale (Dillard & Shen, 2005): 
 
1. The message threatened my freedom to choose. 
2. The message tried to make a decision for me. 
3. The message tried to manipulate me. 
4. The message tried to pressure me. 
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Psychological Reactance (State).  Although reactance was originally conceptualized as 
being a state-specific motivational state, it has also been operationalized and measured as a trait 
(Dillard & Shen, 2005).  Trait reactance is a person’s inclination to distrust authority and resist 
persuasion, and is included in this model as a control variable and discussed more fully in that 
section.  State reactance, or the specific motivational state instigated by a threat, is the 
independent variable of interest.  Dillard and Shen advanced four possible operationalizations of 
state reactance for use in communication research.  These included (a) only cognitions, (b) only 
anger, (c) both anger and cognitions but each defined separately, or (d) a single construct defined 
by both anger and cognitions.  Their research revealed that state reactance is best operationalized 
as a latent construct comprised of state anger and negative cognitions.  Furthermore, they 
persuasively argued that cognitive and affective responses are “empirically inseparable” when 
measuring state reactance (2005:  24).  A second communications study by Quick & Stephenson 
(2007) reinforced Chen & Dillard’s operationalization of state reactance as a latent construct 
comprised of state anger and negative cognitions.  
Prior to Dillard and Shen (2005), state reactance was conceptualized and measured as a 
purely cognitive construct.  It was measured by a variety of self-report techniques, including 
thought-listing (Dillard & Shen, 2005).  In lieu of thought-listing, I generated a list of typical 
negative cognitions which emerged from the qualitative interviews, which includes:  hostility, 
unfair, distrust, hesitant, uneasy, and intimidated.  Respondents were asked to think about the 
specific control system and rate how well these cognitions reflect their feelings using the 
following 6-point scale: 
1. Clearly describes my feelings 
2. Mostly describes my feelings 
3. Somewhat describes my feelings 
4. Somewhat does not describe my feelings 
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5. Mostly does not describe my feelings 
6. Clearly does not describe my feelings 
 
To measure the anger portion of the construct, I used the 4-item scale developed and used 
by Dillard, Kinney, and Cruz, (1996). 
State Anger Scale: 
Consider the (Cockpit Voice Recorder/Flight Data Recorder) when reacting to these statements. 
 
1. I feel irritated 
2. I feel angry 
3. I feel annoyed. 
4. I feel aggravated 
 
These items were measured on a 6-point scale as follows: 
 
1—strongly agree 
2—agree 
3—slightly agree 
4—slightly disagree 
5—disagree 
6—strongly disagree 
  
The values from the cognition scale were summed with the values from the anger scale 
and resulted in the overall “state reactance” value for an individual respondent in regard to a 
specific monitoring system. 
Perception of Justification.  I asked individuals to rate their perception that safety was 
the justification for each specific program on a scale from 0-10.  The response number was input 
to qualtrics via a sliding bar which tracked on a number line from 0 to 10.  I asked on a second 
number line about their perception that performance was the justification, with the same process 
to input the rating. 
Identity Strength.  Individual identity salience was measured using Mael and Ashforth’s 
Organizational Identification (OID), which is conceptualized based on Social Identity Theory as 
“the perception of oneness with or belongingness to an organization, where the individual 
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defines him or herself in terms of the organizations(s) in which he or she is a member” (1992).  
The strength of identification with the company is the most important OID in this context, 
because the company is most closely associated with the threat and subsequent reactance an 
employee feels from a monitoring system.  While there are other groups an employee might 
identify with, including the union and the profession as a whole, the company identity might 
indicate how successful the employee has been socialized to have shared norms and values with 
the entity that is establishing the monitoring protocol.  This company identification strength is 
predicted to moderate the relationship between state reactance and resistant behaviors.   
Organizational Identification (Modified from Mael & Ashforth, 1992): 
1. When someone criticizes (the organization) it feels like a personal insult.  
2. I am very interested in what others think about (the organization).  
3. When I talk about (the organization), I usually say ‘we’ rather than ‘they’.  
4. (The organization)’s successes are my successes.  
5. When someone praises (the organization), it feels like a personal compliment.  
6. If a story in the media criticized (the organization), I would feel embarrassed.  
 
For nearly all independent variables, I recoded the values obtained in the survey in order 
to make left to right on the scale less to more of the particular variable.  This created more 
straightforward interpretations of the coefficients in the regression models.   
In all scales, I did not include a “neutral” category because I feel like it might be 
considered a safe place for employees in what is potentially an emotional subject.  I also feel that 
employees can have an ambivalent feeling toward their employer, especially after many years of 
interaction that might have included situations that were both positive and negative.  This 
ambivalence might result in a tendency for the experiences to negate the others, leading to a 
“neutral” attitude.  I really wanted the respondents to analyze their experience and provide an 
answer that indicated their opinion, one way or the other.  The scale also had the two “slightly” 
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categories which possibly provided a place for a respondent to answer if the attitudes they 
reported are not strong or are somewhat conflicting. 
Control Variables 
Trait Reactance.  A high “reactance trait” would indicate a person who is more likely to 
already have an elevated sensitivity to a perceived loss of freedom.  This predisposition might 
include a distrust of authority, a dislike of attempts at persuasion, or just generally a sense of 
steadfastness and a hesitancy to take advice (Hong & Faedda, 1996).  I included trait reactance as 
a control variable in the model, and measured it using the 11-item Hong Psychological 
Reactance Scale (HPRS), (Hong & Faedda, 1996).  Repeated factor analyses of this scale have 
replicated four distinct factors, which have been labeled “Freedom of Choice”, “Conformity 
Reactance”, “Behavioral Freedom”, and “Reactance to Advice and Recommendations” (Shen & 
Dillard, 2005).  
 (HPRS, Hong & Faedda, 1996) 
1. Regulations trigger a sense of resistance in me. 
2. I find contradicting others stimulating. 
3. When something is prohibited, I usually think, “That’s exactly what I am going to do”. 
4. I consider advice from others to be an intrusion. 
5. I become frustrated when I am unable to make free and independent decisions. 
6. It irritates me when someone points out things which are obvious to me. 
7. I become angry when my freedom of choice is restricted. 
8. Advice and recommendations usually induce me to do just the opposite. 
9. I resist the attempts of others to influence me. 
10. It makes me angry when another person is held up as a role model for me to follow. 
11. When someone forces me to do something, I feel like doing the opposite. 
 
Job Satisfaction.  It is conceivable that some of the behaviors I have discussed to this 
point might be the result of being dissatisfied at work, and not a reaction to being observed.  Job 
satisfaction research has found significant relationships between job satisfaction and a number of 
attitudes, behaviors, and outcomes (e.g. Brown & Peterson, 1993).  The airline industry has a 
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history of contentious relationships between management and workers, especially pilots 
(Hopkins, 1982).  To account for the possible effects related to employee frustration and 
unhappiness with the job, I measured job satisfaction using a five-item scale (Judge, Locke, 
Durham, & Kluger, 1998) and include it as a control variable in the models. 
1. I feel fairly well satisfied with my present job. 
2. Most days I am enthusiastic about my work. 
3. Each day of work seems like it will never end. (R) 
4. I find real enjoyment in my work. 
5. I consider my job rather unpleasant. (R) 
 
Other control variables.  Other variables I collected data for are generally demographic, 
including flight training background (military or civilian), current crew position (Captain or First 
Officer), age, and gender.  I do not have a theoretical explanation for the effect of these 
variables, but include them to account for any variance they explain.   
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Chapter Five 
Results 
 The interviews and pilot test of the survey indicated variance in how individuals felt 
about the different control systems.  There is also evidence that the control systems operate 
somewhat differently.  The ACARS reports performance more or less continuously, while the 
FOQA and Black Boxes only report in the case of deviations from normal.  While one pilot 
might feel highly threatened and distrusting of the FOQA system, another might feel that it is a 
good system with positive outcomes.  In this light, I chose to analyze the hypothesized 
relationships for each system separately. 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Tables 4A, 4B, and 4C report the means, standard deviations, correlations, and 
reliabilities of the measures for each system, respectively.  The reliability for every scale exceeds 
.90 except for two, indirect resistance and direct resistance for the FOQA system.  The Alpha for 
indirect resistance is .75, which still exceeds the .70 threshold recommended by Nunnally 
(1978).  The measure for “direct resistance to FOQA” is made up of only two items, which can 
result in a relatively lower Alpha than a multi-item construct.   
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Some correlations emerge as noteworthy.  Consistent with Hypothesis 4, the level of 
company identification (Variable 7) is significantly correlated with indirect resistance and 
malicious compliance.  The perceived threat and the state reactance for each system are also 
highly correlated (.68, .66, and .64), which foreshadows a high regression R2 when perceived 
threat predicts state reactance.  Statistics literature states a rule of thumb that correlation between 
two predictor variables should be no more than .8 or .9, and caution should be exercised when 
correlation is .7 or greater (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).  This helps avoid issues of 
multicollinearity and associated problems interpreting coefficients of highly correlated 
independent variables.  While these variables do not quite reach this threshold, the higher than 
expected relationship might be due to construct or methodological issues, or a combination of 
both. 
Further post-hoc analysis on these particular constructs and their measurement is 
warranted.  First, it is important to determine the extent to which the scales might be measuring 
the same concept.  The construct measurements are previously developed scales that have been 
used and validated in published research (Dillard & Shen, 2005; Quick & Bates, 2010; Quick & 
Stephenson, 2007b).  The perception of threat four-item scale asks about impact on decision-
making, impact on autonomy, and perceived pressure to modify job practices.  The alpha was .90 
or better across systems.  The state reactance scales focus more on anger and negative 
cognitions, and also achieved similar alphas of .90 or higher.  Considering the face validity of 
each construct, it appears the scales measure meaningfully different ideas.  In a broad sense, each 
construct could also be placed in the realm of negative affect, and might be similarly regarded by 
a respondent and give results with unsurprisingly high correlation.  In order to empirically 
support this assertion, I ran a Confirmatory Factor Analysis that considered the combined items 
  
74 
from each scale, and forced the solution to have two factors.  Those results are summarized in 
Table 5 below, with coefficients below .30 suppressed from the data.   
 
 As expected two clear components emerge from this analysis.  The anger scale questions, 
however, which are expected to load with the negative cognitions to form the state reactance 
measure, actually have loading with the items from the perception of threat scale.  As previously 
noted, at face value these scales seem to measure different concepts, and these results suggest 
higher cross-loading than expected and the need for a closer look at methods. 
The two constructs for each system appeared on sequential “pages” of the online survey.  
In an effort to counterbalance the item order and mitigate common method bias, the four state-
anger items were interspersed throughout the threat perception items.  In doing so, it appears that 
this effort may have led to the state-anger items loading more than expected with the threat 
perception items, and a possibly inflated correlation.  Despite this, the measures reflect good 
reliability and have established validity, which provides solid basis for interpretation of the 
results. 
 Tables 6A, B, and C report the results for hypotheses 1 and 2.  The first hypothesis in the 
model is basically a test of the fundamental assertion of reactance theory, that people who feel a 
threat to their autonomy will have a higher level of reactance than those who do not. 
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 The results for Model 2 show strong support for the first hypothesis, with the perception 
of threat significantly predicting state reactance for all three systems at p < .01.  These results are 
not surprising given the high correlations and relative homogeneity of the sample, but should be 
interpreted with caution given the potential for method bias previously discussed.  
Hypothesis 2 predicts that the state reactance a person experiences might depend on the 
underlying justification for the program, which is also one of Brehm’s early postulates 
concerning Reactance Theory (1966).  In this specific context, the more a pilot’s perception is 
that safety is the organization’s underlying justification for monitoring, the lower the level of 
state reactance the pilot will experience.  Model 3 includes this perception as a predictor 
variable, then Model 4 includes the interaction term perceived threat x perception of safety.  In 
all cases, the perception of safety is negatively and significantly (p < .01) related to state 
reactance, when controlling for perception of threat.  The interaction term is only significant in 
the case of the FOQA system, however, and is plotted in Figure 2. 
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The points are plotted at one standard deviation below and above the mean for each 
variable, respectively.  For those pilots with low threat perception (solid line), the reaction to 
justification is as theorized.  As the belief that safety is the justification for the program 
increases, the state reactance decreases.  Alternatively, for those pilots who have high threat 
perceptions, as the belief that safety is the justification for the program increases, the state 
reactance actually increases as well.  Although different slopes are expected in the interaction, an 
increase in reactance for the high threat group is unexpected, and therefore does not completely 
support the hypothesized relationship.  The coefficient for the interaction predictor in all three 
systems is consistent in the same direction, but only reaches significance for the FOQA system.  
Given the unexpected interaction for those who perceive high threats and the lack of significance 
in two of the three systems, Hypothesis 2 is not supported.   
Tables 7A, B, and C include models testing the hypotheses associated with the right half 
of the overall model, with hypothesized relationships between state reactance, identity with the 
company, and the dependent variables (indirect resistance behaviors and malicious compliance).  
Each system has four models associated with the two dependent variables, respectively. 
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Hypothesis 3A, which says higher levels of state reactance will be related to higher levels 
of indirect resistance, is strongly supported across systems.  When the strength of identification 
with the company is included as a predictor (Model 2), it is also significant and in the expected 
direction, but only the p < .10 confidence level.  This indicates that as the identification with the 
company is stronger, lower levels of indirect resistance are predicted.  Model 4 for each system 
is a test of Hypothesis 4A, which predicts that the levels of indirect resistance will be affected by 
levels of identification, such that those that have the strongest identification with the company 
will display the lowest levels of resistance behavior.  This is supported at the p < .05 level in all 
cases except for the FOQA system.  These interactions for the ACARS system and Black Boxes 
are interpreted and graphed in Figures 3 and 4 below, again at one standard deviation above and 
below the mean for each variable. 
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  Figure 3 
 
  Figure 4 
 
Each interaction effect has similar patterns for the two systems.  As reactance increases, 
indirect resistance behavior also increases at a steady rate for those who do not have strong 
identification with the company.  For those who do have strong identification, the increasing 
levels of reactance do not affect the frequency of resistance behavior.  Although the interaction 
effect for the FOQA system was not significant, it was mathematically consistent with the two 
systems above.  Overall, there seems to be solid support of Hypothesis 4A, particularly for the 
ACARS system and Black Boxes.   
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Hypotheses 3B and 4B predict the same relationships except malicious compliance is the 
dependent variable.  None of the hypotheses were supported predicting malicious compliance, 
except a significant interaction effect for the ACARS system at the .10 level. 
While there is not a significant direct relationship in the malicious compliance models, 
one noteworthy observation is that the control variable “job satisfaction” is consistently 
significant across models in the expected direction.  Lower job satisfaction is highly predictive of 
correspondingly higher levels of malicious compliance. 
Single Factor Test.  The final empirical analysis accomplished is a test to ascertain the 
existence of common method bias, which is variance that is attributable to the method as 
opposed to the measurement construct itself.  This bias might introduce systematic measurement 
error which can create alternative explanations for hypothesized relationships (Podsakoff, 
MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003).  When the variables are all measured from a single source, 
as they are in this study, one method to retrospectively check for common method bias is to run a 
factor analysis for all variables in the model.  If they load on to one primary factor, then a serious 
problem with method bias would be indicated (Podsakoff, et al., 2003).  I accomplished a factor 
analysis using principal components extraction for all primary variables, and five components 
returned eigenvalues over 1.0.  The first component accounted for 29% of the total variance, and 
the top five components accounted for a cumulative variance of 62%.  These overall results show 
some indication of a primary explanatory component, but the fact that four others emerged 
separately suggests common method bias is not a serious issue in the overall model.  This is 
shown graphically in Table 8 below: 
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         Table 8 
 
Interesting patterns emerge from this principal components analysis.  As expected, the 
first component is primarily the threat and state reactance variables for each system.  The second 
combines company identification and job satisfaction, variables that are somewhat intuitively 
linked.  The third component does not have a cohesive story, but the fourth is interesting in that it 
combines the two dependent variables, indirect resistance and malicious compliance.  Finally, 
the fifth component highlights a relationship between two variables not utilized in the models, 
the union and profession ID.  These and other observations and their impact on theory will be 
further discussed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter Six 
Discussion, Limitations and Implications 
This chapter will discuss the results of the survey, which provide general support for the 
main theorized relationships in the model, and mixed support for the variables that are theorized 
to moderate those relationships.  First, I will discuss the results of Hypotheses 1 and 2, which are 
derived from the relationship between perceived threat, state reactance, and justification.  Next I 
will move to Hypotheses 3 and 4, which include the relationship between state reactance, 
resistant behaviors, and organizational identity.  I will then explain what I believe are limitations 
to this research, and finally describe implications for theory and possible future research 
avenues.   
Discussion 
Hypothesis 1 predicts a positive significant relationship between perceived threat levels 
and psychological reactance.  This hypothesis is based on an underlying assumption of 
Psychological Reactance Theory (PRT) that individuals believe they have an inherent right to be 
autonomous agents (Brehm, 1966).  The perceived threat measure specifically asks about threats 
to autonomy by focusing on the impact of certain management control systems on being able to 
do a job as the employee sees fit.  State reactance is defined as an emotional state triggered by a 
specific threat that creates motivation to regain control of behavioral freedom (Brehm & Brehm, 
1981).  As expected, in a model where threat perception predicts state reactance, the R-squared 
showing the proportion of variance explained by the model is high, and offers reinforcement to 
the relatively lengthy empirical record supporting the primary basic prediction of PRT.   
As explored in Chapter 5, there may have been method and/or construct bias that could 
be related to inflated statistical relationships between the two constructs.  But the strong 
correlation is also expected in that they occupy similar somewhat negative dimensions in the 
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overall landscape of affect and emotion.  Additionally, the selection criteria for airline pilots is 
stringent, and often those chosen have very similar behavioral traits.  The highly correlated 
findings are not surprising given the relatively homogenous nature of the target population.  
Since Dillard and Shen’s operationalization of state reactance as a latent construct 
comprised of state anger and negative cognitions in 2005, most new research has come in the 
communications and marketing fields (Quick & Stephenson, 2007; Rains & Turner, 2008; Quick 
& Bates, 2010).  Presently, I am not aware of any research in organizational studies 
(Organizational Behavior, Organizational Theory) that apply state reactance measures using 
Dillard and Shen’s conceptualization (2005).  The findings in the present research extend the 
validity of the measure by including the organizational context.   
The second hypothesis on this half of the model predicts an interaction effect with the 
“perception of safety as the organization’s justification” moderating the threat-state reactance 
relationship.  PRT theorizes that two aspects of an individual’s perception will affect the 
subsequent level of reactance:  the legitimacy of the source and the justification (Brehm, 1966).  
In an employment situation, I presume the legitimacy to be largely unquestioned by individual 
employees and therefore have minimal effect on resulting state reactance.  In the context of this 
study, justification by the company for monitoring systems might be very important.  Individuals 
might interpret their perception that safety is the justification as a signal from the company of a 
more important purpose than just efficient performance, which would be expected to diminish 
subsequent negative emotional responses.  For those who have higher perceptions of safety as 
the primary justification for the monitoring system, the state reactance will be lower for a given 
threat perception.  The results provide support for this direct relationship.  For one unit higher in 
this perception, the state reactance score is expected to be about .15 points lower on average 
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across systems. “Justification is safety” as a predictor variable is significant in all three cases, 
and in the expected direction.  
The results for the interaction, however, were not significant except in the case of the 
FOQA system.  For two of the three control systems, the level of reactance does not depend on 
perception of safety.  Is there something unique about the FOQA system that might make the 
interaction effect significant?  The raw mean threat score for FOQA is 3.43, compared to 2.68 
for the Black Boxes, and 2.60 for the ACARS.  The FOQA system is clearly perceived as more 
of a threat than the Black Boxes and ACARS.  The qualitative interviews indicated the FOQA 
program is thought of as somewhat punitive in nature.  This is the system that effectively 
monitors a pilot’s performance, and records and flags deviations for supervisory review.  
Punishment could range from temporary grounding and additional training to loss of 
employment.  The Black Boxes are considered to be almost exclusively a safety program, and 
although there is a threat from the information gathered to be leaked, the level of concern does 
not approach that related to the FOQA program.  The ACARS, as well, is seen as more of a 
nuisance that might lead to a reprimand, but does not gather and report the type of data that 
might get an individual pilot fired.   
The group that had the unexpected result was the pilots who perceived the highest threat, 
creating the interaction for the FOQA system.  I expected higher perceived justification of safety 
to decrease the state reactance, closer to a point near the low perceived threat group.  The results 
showed the opposite effect and the state reactance actually increased for this group.  One 
explanation for this may be that once a certain threshold of perceived threat is crossed, 
organizational justification cannot placate the resulting state reactance.  The FOQA system may 
be the only one of the three systems in which the perceived threat exceeds this threshold.  
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Therefore, these findings do not support the idea that justification might moderate the threat-
reactance relationship, and in fact is opposite of the prediction in the case of those who feel 
threatened the most, specifically by the FOQA system. 
Moving to the right half of the model, Hypothesis 3A and 3B predict that higher state 
reactance will be related to higher levels of the two dependent variables, indirect resistance 
behaviors and malicious compliance.  In accordance with reactance theory, as people experience 
higher levels of reactance, they look for ways to either regain the lost freedom or expand their 
behavioral freedom in other areas.  As previously discussed, the focus of this research is on 
indirect behaviors that do not directly challenge the monitoring system itself.  For all three 
control systems, higher levels of state reactance were significantly related (p <. 01) to higher 
levels of indirect resistance behavior.  This research establishes the idea that in organizational 
studies, threatened behavior might most likely be met with responsive behaviors that are 
peripheral to the focal situation where control systems are deployed.  It is noteworthy, however, 
that the indirect behaviors most frequently displayed by the pilots were intentionally disregarding 
dress and appearance standards and placing a negative sticker on the flight bag, which are the 
most outwardly obvious behaviors on the list.  While employees may not want to re-establish 
directly threatened behavior, it may feel more empowering to act in a public way to gain social 
acknowledgment and feedback. 
On the other hand, I found no direct relationship between elevated reactance levels and 
malicious compliance, which is surprising.  Malicious compliance, the intentional withholding of 
behaviors beyond contractual obligations, seems like it would be similar to indirect resistance 
behavior in that it might be difficult to detect or observe and is most likely not a behavior 
specifically related to a control system.  While the coefficients in the models are positive (the 
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expected sign), the effect is not statistically significant.  One explanation for this might be that 
the construct measure was one item.  Further investigation and clarification of this construct 
might lead to a multi-item measure and capture the boundaries more completely.   
It may also be that the results are correct in that pilots do not resort to this type of 
behavior when control systems create a threat to autonomy.  The indirect and direct resistance 
behaviors in this study all include some form of acting out, while malicious compliance is a lack 
of action.  Although it is a conscious decision and might re-establish some level of control on an 
individual level, malicious compliance may be perceived by the employee differently than taking 
a specific action.  It may not fully quench the need to regain autonomy in response to reactance.  
Other statistical relationships lend credibility to this idea, as the control variable “job 
satisfaction” is significantly (p < .05) related to malicious compliance across systems.  
This result aligns with the theme of this research, that there might be alternative paths to 
fostering desired employee behavior.  One is by bureaucratically establishing rules and 
procedures, then monitoring to check on their effectiveness.  Another might be to instill an 
internal desire within an employee to do what is best for the organization.  The outcome of these 
socialization efforts might be higher job satisfaction and higher organizational identity, which 
have been shown in the literature to be significantly correlated (e.g. Van Dick, et al, 2004).  I 
discuss this moderation of the reactance-resistance behavior relationship below. 
Hypotheses 4A and 4B are the final hypotheses, and predict that the strength of the 
relationships in Hypotheses 3A and 3B will depend on the amount an individual identifies with 
the company (OID).  Social Identity Theory has shown that an individual’s identity salience can 
be a strong predictor of behavioral outcomes (e.g. Hogg & Terry, 2000).  The hypothesized 
moderation effect received moderate support for the indirect resistance models.  The interaction 
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term was supported at the .05 confidence level for both the ACARS system and Black Boxes, 
and was in the expected direction but did not reach significance for the FOQA system.  With 
regard to the two significant systems, for those pilots with a strong company identity, the level of 
state reactance has little to no effect on the level of indirect resistance.  However, for those pilots 
with a lower company identity, higher levels of state reactance were related to higher levels of 
indirect resistance.  To the extent an employee’s identity is aligned with the organization, he or 
she perceives they are psychologically intertwined with the fate of the group, sharing a common 
destiny, and experiencing its successes and failures (Mael & Ashforth, 1992).  Additionally, 
Social Identity research has shown that individuals tend to engage in activities congruent with 
their most salient identities, and share norms and values with other members (e.g. Ashforth & 
Mael, 1989).  This suggests strong identification with the company provides a cognitive guide to 
behavior that is generally supportive of the organization and aligned with its goals.  While these 
individuals may feel an elevated state reactance, they overcome the emotion and temper their 
behavior so as not to potentially harm the company. 
This is another case where the FOQA system has distinct results.  The mean for state 
reactance for the FOQA system is 3.49, compared to 2.97 for the Black Boxes and 2.86 for the 
ACARS.  Consistent with higher threat levels, the FOQA system has higher reactance levels, as 
well.  It may be that above a certain reactance level, only reached by the FOQA system in this 
research, pilots will tend to have more uniform behavioral reactions, regardless of OID.  It may 
also be that the nature of the FOQA system overrides potential moderating effects of OID, which 
is similar to the discussion for Hypothesis 2.  Since this monitoring system seems to present the 
most lethal threat, the results suggest that pilots will act out more readily, despite identity 
influences.   However, the direction of the coefficient is as expected (albeit non-significant), so it 
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is not necessarily contradictory to the hypothesis.  Given this and the significance of the 
coefficient on the Black Boxes and ACARS, there is modest support for Hypothesis 4. 
Limitations 
The primary challenge with resistance research is being able to accurately identify the 
behaviors that are classified as resistant (Prasad & Prasad, 2000).  Different research designs to 
capture these behaviors offer tradeoffs.  More controlled environments that are not dependent on 
individual self-reporting depend instead on an observer or machine to accurately determine the 
occurrence of specific behaviors of interest.  These observers have difficulty determining 
underlying intent and behaviors that an observer might categorize as resistant might actually be 
an honest mistake on the part of the subject.  In sum, researchers have noted the unique nature of 
resistance sets it outside the scope of traditional observation or laboratory research (Prasad & 
Prasad, 2000). 
Designs that try to overcome these obstacles, including the present study, use subject 
self-reporting in an attempt to determine underlying intentionality, which might be an indication 
of motive.  These designs, however, depend on the veracity of the respondent as well as the 
ability of the instrument to obtain unbiased data.  In fact, I regard the dependence on self-reports 
as the source for measurement of all variables to be a limitation in this study.  However, I believe 
there is ample justification for the chosen methodology, and there was a priori consideration 
given to common method bias in the design and application of the survey instrument. 
 The risk for using a self-rating versus other-rating measurement instrument is that a 
respondent might systematically be influenced to respond to items in similar fashion, possibly 
yielding spurious inflated correlations (Conway & Lance, 2010).  The variables in this study, 
however, would be difficult to rate by an observer or associate.  They are perceptions (of threat, 
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justification), internal emotions or attitudes (state reactance, OID), or behaviors that need an 
attached motive for evaluation (resistance).  In other words, they are “private”, and as such are 
“clearly appropriate” to be self-reported (Chan, 2009).  Additionally, other-rating measurements 
can be susceptible to similar biases as self-reports, such as response sets or affect bias, although 
there are misconceptions in the Social Sciences that other-reports are innately superior (Conway 
& Lance, 2010).  Despite the limitations and potential for inflated correlation, I believe the self-
reporting instrument is best-suited for measuring the research variables. 
In addition, proactive strategies noted in the methods literature (e.g. Podsakoff, 
MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003) were utilized to design and administer the survey in such a 
way to mitigate potential method bias.  First, reassurance of respondent anonymity was made on 
the introduction of the survey, on the lead-in to the indirect resistance behavior question (which 
was identified as the most sensitive in the think-aloud interviews), and on the forum posting 
inviting participation.  Anonymity might help avoid social desirability effects and provide more 
forthcoming responses.  The scales which seemed to induce the most negative affect were placed 
toward the end of the survey, in order to minimize negative priming.  The scales themselves were 
nearly all chosen from previous studies where they showed solid validity and reliability.  Finally, 
some state reactance items were interspersed among the perceived threat scale in order to 
minimize the potential for response sets to a grouping of like-items.   
Despite these efforts, there is some evidence of method bias.  The combined state-anger 
items which were interspersed with the threat perception scale might have influenced 
respondents to answer in a “response set” since those items were presented on the same page, 
resulting in a higher than expected correlation.  This issue was thoroughly discussed in Chapter 
5, but is also mentioned here as a limitation because the particularly high correlations and 
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regression results associated with these measures should be interpreted with restraint.  However, 
I believe the benefit of obtaining primary data and relatively accurate underlying intent about 
resistance behavior is worth this possible introduction of measurement error. 
Another limitation of this research related to constructs is the measure for malicious 
compliance.  The early theorizing and construction of models was related to malicious 
compliance as the primary dependent variable of interest.  The results, however, did not support 
the hypothesized relationships, which was disappointing and not consistent with the results for 
the other dependent variable, indirect resistance. The lack of significant results might be due to 
the narrow definition and measurement of the construct.  A broader operationalization of this 
construct might reveal more facets of the behavior, and result in stronger relationships with state 
reactance.  Specifically, do individuals view the act of intentionally complying with contractual 
expectations as a proactive or withdrawal behavior?  Are there specific antecedents leading to 
this activity?  Are there certain types of situations that are more likely to lead to malicious 
compliance?  Additionally, the construct was to some extent correlated with the indirect 
resistance behaviors.  The temporal relationship between these behaviors might be informative.  
In other words, is there an order that individuals generally follow when exercising resistance 
behaviors?  Is malicious compliance the “last straw” for employees or is it the initial resistance 
behavior?  Answers to these and other questions in a more fully explored construct analysis 
might result in support of the hypothesized relationships. 
Related to this issue, the scale for both dependent variables was a frequency.  In this 
context, pilots do not fly the same number of hours.  A pilot who flies once a month, but has a 
resistant behavior every time he flies, might characterize that behavior as “rarely” or 
“sometimes”.  On the other hand, a pilot who flies four times per week and has a resistance 
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behavior on one of those flights, might characterize this behavior as “often”, even though his 
behavioral resistance rate is lower by comparison.  The evidence from the qualitative interviews, 
however, showed most pilots flying between 50 and 80 hours per month.  While I believe the 
generic frequency scale captured a consistent assessment of different rates of behavior, it may 
have been more accurate to ask about behaviors per flight.   
A final limitation is that the results might be highly contextual, and not very 
generalizable to other types of autonomous workers.  The monitoring literature points out that 
the capability to monitor employees is increasing at a rapid pace (Stanton, 2000).  Jobs that 
traditionally enjoyed a high level of autonomy and behavioral freedom are now under ever-
increasing management scrutiny.  So I would argue that the sample for this study is 
representative of those types of jobs that have autonomy, but are also becoming more highly 
monitored.  Professions that might be included in this category are physician, pharmacist, truck 
driver, or lawyer, to name a few.  A lawyer, for instance, might find himself in a new computer-
based system of billing.  It seems reasonable that a lawyer in this situation would comply with 
the billing system, but react in other ways like coming into work later than usual, or challenging 
certain appearance standards at the firm, like growing a moustache.  Truck drivers and other 
types of transportation professionals might find their vehicles tracked by GPS or have video 
cameras installed.  These workers who were used to a high level of freedom while operating 
might find themselves more tightly bound by management surveillance.  They would likely 
follow the new rules being specifically observed, but express their freedom in ways peripheral to 
operating the vehicle.   
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Implications 
 The results of this survey have important implications for the theories underlying the 
tested hypotheses.  Research in Electronic Performance Monitoring (EPM) has been contextually 
limited by using primarily laboratory observations on simple, repetitive tasks to determine the 
effects of electronic controls.  Results have been mixed, finding both negative and positive 
aspects of monitoring.  The contextual setting of this study is an important contribution in that 
the authority relationship exists in reality as do the threat of punishment and reprimand.  It also 
distinctively concerns relatively autonomous employees who are under surveillance by three 
separate EPM systems.  This type of employee is understudied in the EPM literature, and the 
results suggest reactions that are beyond what is theorized by EPM scholars.  In essence, this 
research unites EPM research with resistance theory. 
Psychological Reactance Theory (PRT), initially articulated in 1966, has been used 
infrequently in organizational studies.  This research found solid support for the main proposition 
that threatened individuals will have a heightened emotional reaction that includes aspects of 
anger and negative cognitions, which primes them to seek out ways to re-establish control and 
autonomy.  I also found support for the justification aspect of the theory, that individuals 
consider how the organization might justify the source of the threat.  But there was not support to 
indicate that there are differences between those who perceive low and high justification. 
Additionally, PRT’s prediction that outcomes might be either indirect or direct was also 
supported, particularly for indirect behaviors.  The primary contribution of this research to PRT 
is its application in the organizational studies context, and the suggestion that indirect behaviors 
will be the most prevalent response.  The qualitative interviews as well as the significant survey 
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results support this assertion.  And while the interviews indicated that direct resistance to 
particular systems was an uncommon behavior, survey respondents reported higher frequencies 
of direct resistance than interview respondents (Appendix C).  It is possible that the anonymity of 
the survey led people to be more open about these potentially sensitive activities.   
These findings also strengthen recent research in resistance theory.  In particular, 
following Braverman’s Labor Process Theory (1974) from Sociology, individuals are seen as 
active agents who have skill sets that are diminished and neglected by the control systems of 
modern capitalism.  Resistance is ubiquitous and uniquely individual, comprised of mostly subtle 
acts occurring in all facets of the workplace environment.  The results support this theoretical 
movement away from large-scale, organized labor protests, and demonstrates that resistance is a 
uniquely individual and socially constructed behavior.  The indirect resistance measure included 
behaviors in many different aspects of the job, and further research may reveal more examples of 
such indirect resistance that could undermine organizational effectiveness.   
The findings related to Organizational Identity are notable, and reinforce already well-
defined and supported findings from the Social Identity Theory (Social Psychology) and Identity 
(Sociology) literatures.  This research, however, uses OID as a mechanistic construct to explain 
some of the tenets of control theory, particularly those concepts included in clan control (Ouchi, 
1980) and concertive control (Barker, 1993).  These ideas diverge from strict bureaucratic 
control, in that individual behavior is molded through pressures of group membership and peer 
influence instead of by rules and policies.  The findings reinforce the idea that identity strength 
can be a powerful influence on employee behavior, which is the ultimate goal of control systems.  
Specifically, however, the system eliciting the highest reactance, FOQA, did not have an 
interaction effect from OID.  This indicates that those with higher OID had statistically the same 
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behavioral response to reactance as those with lower OID.  This indicates that this effect is most 
pronounced at relatively low levels of employee reactance.  It is possible that even those who 
have the highest OID might still be subject to the effects of reactance and the subsequent 
motivation to re-establish behavioral freedom.   
Further Research.  While the findings are generally supportive of the hypothesized 
relationships, the support would be enhanced if they could be replicated in autonomous jobs in 
different contextual settings.  Airline pilots are a fairly homogenous sample, hired from a narrow 
pool of a thin slice of the overall population.  It might be considered conservative that there were 
findings among such a sample, but it would also be meaningful to expand the research to other 
contexts.  Other control variables might also be considered in order to exploit potential 
heterogeneity.  In this sample, I asked about general demographic information, but more specific 
items like tenure at the company or experience in companies with similar monitoring systems 
might provide more meaningful information.   
As mentioned, the primary behavior of interest in this project was malicious compliance.  
The lack of significant results might be due to the narrow definition of the construct.  A broader 
operationalization and measurement of this construct might reveal more facets of the behavior, 
and result in stronger relationships with state reactance.  Specifically, do individuals view the act 
of intentionally complying with contractual expectations as a proactive or withdrawal behavior?  
What are the antecedents leading to this activity?  For example, a research stream that predicts 
malicious compliance as a specific outcome of lower job satisfaction might be a meaningful 
extension to that well-researched literature.   
I hypothesized that the strength of identity would primarily have effects on the reactance-
resistance relationship.  As discussed, reactance research has shown a relationship between 
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threatened autonomy and elevated levels of reactance in many different contexts.  In this setting, 
as well, it seemed more likely that high-identity individuals would still experience this internal 
frustration at losing autonomy, but that the high shared identity would diminish subsequent 
behavioral reactions.  However, a logical extension of this research might be to determine if 
there is an effect of identity on the perceived threat-reactance relationship, or if it is an 
antecedent to initial levels of perceived threat.   
Implications for Practice.  This research highlights the importance of systems thinking 
and consideration of multiple courses of action and effects when implementing control measures.  
While EPM programs may provide a large amount of data at a low cost and very little human 
interaction, there might also be second and third-order effects which are difficult from a 
managerial perspective to foresee.  Employees have been shown to be very creative at subverting 
control programs, through a variety of means.  This research shows they can demonstrate indirect 
resistance behavior that could also be harmful to the organization, or at least indicate a lack of 
shared values.  Additionally, long-term negative reactions, from physiological harm to a loss of 
trust in the company, might be a result of monitoring programs that diminish autonomy. 
Another consideration for practitioners is the type of indirect resistance that was most 
frequent, the display of a sticker on the pilot flight bag and improper dress and appearance.  It 
seems as though even small, somewhat inconsequential behaviors satisfied the desire to act out.  
If a manager is installing a new program that curtails behavioral freedom, it might be wise to 
allow some flexibility in other less important areas for employees to exercise their autonomy. 
Finally, it might be meaningful from a managerial perspective to categorize presumed 
resistance behaviors in other ways, such as functional vs. non-functional or by the overall impact 
to important processes.  This might also inform targeted policies and enforcement as opposed to 
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simply trying to eliminate all behaviors that appear to be counter to company expectations.  For 
example, the improper wear of the uniform, while symbolically important, might have little 
impact on the performance of the operation.  A more impactful behavior, like holding up a 
process until certain paperwork is perfectly complete, could have major implications, and require 
more attention from managers.” 
Conclusion 
This research program was phenomenon-driven:  I was intrigued by strong public belief 
that the prospect of video cameras in commercial cockpits would be a panacea for recent 
incidents, which was met by an equally emotional negative reaction by pilots to this suggestion.  
Why would a pilot who is already “well-monitored” be adverse to simply a different kind of 
monitoring?  Maybe it is that the pilots do have negative reactions to the existing monitoring 
systems, they just are not very evident to the casual observer.  The face-to-face interviews and 
survey provided insight to these reactions and the nature of subsequent resistant behaviors in a 
highly monitored environment.  The findings might recalibrate opinions of those who think EPM 
systems just melt into the background noise and are not affecting behaviors.  As these results 
show, however, the introduction of EPM will have a negative impact at some level of operation, 
and implementation of these control systems should be driven by a substantial need or positive 
expected outcome.  
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Appendix A 
Semi-Structured Interview Guide 
You are being interviewed to provide background data for a study concerning control 
systems at work.  This study will be followed by a larger survey where all xxxx pilots will have 
the opportunity to participate.  Your answers will be recorded accurately and used only to 
enhance this research.  I am not recording any identifying aspects that might link you to your 
answers.  I appreciate your time and honest insight.  
 
1. Tell me about your background in commercial aviation. 
a. Length of time, different airlines or unions, aircraft flown, schedule and 
routes, qualifications 
2. Are you aware of any control systems while you are operating the aircraft? 
3. Describe your experience with the following programs: 
a. LOSA  
i. Have you ever been asked to participate in the LOSA program? 
ii. Have you refused a LOSA observer?  Have you seen another pilot 
refuse a LOSA observer?  Why? 
b. FOQA 
i. How have you seen this data be used?  Who uses it (chief pilots, 
safety, etc)? 
ii. Have you ever heard of anyone being singled out using data from this 
system (for punishment or otherwise)? 
c. CVR/FDR 
i. Have you ever seen anyone disable or otherwise manipulate this 
system?  Why? 
d. ACARS automated reporting 
i. Have you ever seen anyone disable or override this system?  Why? 
4. What is your assessment of the benefits and shortcomings of these systems? 
a. FOQA 
b. LOSA 
c. CVR/FD 
d. ACARS 
5. What are some of the behavioral reactions you have seen from pilots relating to these 
systems or programs? 
6. Do you have any opinion about video monitors being placed in the cockpit? 
7. Have you ever seen other pilots intentionally withhold behavior that might have been 
good for the operation but was outside of contractual obligations?  Have you ever 
experienced this situation?  Why did you choose your course of action? 
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Appendix B 
Survey Instrument 
Airline Pilots 2012 
 
Q1 Thank you very much for participating in this survey.  I am a twice furloughed xxxx pilot, finishing the last 
stages of a PhD program in Organizational Studies.  I really appreciate your time.  This study supports research 
about control systems at work, specifically your perceptions of surveillance in the cockpit and subsequent reactions.  
Findings from this program might help organizations design more effective control systems and lead to a better 
understanding of employee behavior.   The survey should take approximately 15 minutes to complete and 
participation in this survey is completely voluntary.  Your answers will be anonymous and only the principal 
investigators will have access to your responses.  Demographic data are for research purposes only, and your 
individual responses will not be released to (the airline) or (the union).  If you have any questions or concerns about 
the survey or research program, please contact First Officer Pat Heflin via email at patrick.heflin@colorado.edu.     
Thanks again! 
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Q2 The following statements concern your thoughts about (the airline). 
 Strongly 
Agree (1) 
Agree (2) Somewhat 
Agree (3) 
Somewhat 
Disagree (4) 
Disagree (5) Strongly 
Disagree (6) 
When 
someone 
criticizes (the 
airline), it 
feels like a 
personal 
insult. (1) 
            
I am very 
interested in 
what others 
think about 
(the airline). 
(2) 
            
When I talk 
about (the 
airline), I 
usually say 
"we" rather 
than "they". 
(3) 
            
(the airline)' s 
successes are 
my successes. 
(4) 
            
When 
someone 
praises (the 
airline), it 
feels like a 
personal 
compliment. 
(5) 
            
If a story in 
the media 
criticizes (the 
airline), I feel 
embarrassed. 
(6) 
            
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Q3 The following statements concern your thoughts about (THE UNION). 
 Strongly 
Agree (1) 
Agree (2) Somewhat 
Agree (3) 
Somewhat 
Disagree (4) 
Disagree (5) Strongly 
Disagree (6) 
When 
someone 
criticizes 
(THE 
UNION), it 
feels like a 
personal 
insult. (1) 
            
I am very 
interested in 
what others 
think about 
(THE 
UNION). (2) 
            
When I talk 
about (THE 
UNION), I 
usually say 
"we" rather 
than "they". 
(3) 
            
(THE 
UNION)'s 
successes are 
my successes. 
(4) 
            
When 
someone 
praises (THE 
UNION), it 
feels like a 
personal 
compliment. 
(5) 
            
If a story in 
the media 
criticizes 
(THE 
UNION), I 
feel 
embarrassed. 
(6) 
            
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Q4 The following statements concern your thoughts about the pilot profession. 
 Strongly 
Agree (1) 
Agree (2) Somewhat 
Agree (3) 
Somewhat 
Disagree (4) 
Disagree (5) Strongly 
Disagree (6) 
When 
someone 
criticizes 
pilots, it feels 
like a 
personal 
insult. (1) 
            
I am very 
interested in 
what others 
think about 
the pilot 
profession. 
(2) 
            
When I talk 
about pilots, I 
usually say 
"we" rather 
than "they". 
(3) 
            
Other pilot's 
successes are 
my successes. 
(4) 
            
When 
someone 
praises the 
pilot 
profession, it 
feels like a 
personal 
compliment. 
(5) 
            
If a story in 
the media 
criticizes the 
pilot 
profession, I 
feel 
embarrassed. 
(6) 
            
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Q5 The following statements address your feelings about autonomy. 
 Strongly 
Agree (1) 
Agree (2) Somewhat 
Agree (3) 
Somewhat 
Disagree (4) 
Disagree (5) Strongly 
Disagree (6) 
I find 
contradicting 
others 
stimulating. (1) 
            
Regulations (i.e. 
policies and 
procedures) 
trigger a sense of 
resistance in me. 
(2) 
            
When something 
is prohibited, I 
usually think, 
"That's exactly 
what I am going 
to do". (3) 
            
I consider advice 
from others to be 
an intrusion. (4) 
            
I become 
frustrated when I 
am unable to 
make free and 
independent 
decisions. (5) 
            
It irritates me 
when someone 
points out things 
which are 
obvious to me. 
(6) 
            
I become angry 
when my 
freedom of 
choice is 
restricted. (7) 
            
Advice and 
recommendations 
usually induce 
me to do just the 
opposite. (8) 
            
I resist the 
attempts of 
others to 
influence me. (9) 
            
It makes me 
angry when 
another person is 
held up as a role 
model for me to 
follow. (10) 
            
When someone 
forces me to do 
something, I feel 
like doing the 
opposite. (11) 
            
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Q34 These statements address your feelings about your work. 
 Strongly 
Agree (1) 
Agree (2) Somewhat 
Agree (3) 
Somewhat 
Disagree (4) 
Disagree (5) Strongly 
Disagree (6) 
I feel fairly 
well satisfied 
with my 
present job. 
(1) 
            
I consider my 
job rather 
unpleasant. 
(2) (R) 
            
Most days I 
am 
enthusiastic 
about my 
work. (3) 
            
Each day of 
work I wish 
would go on 
forever. (4) 
            
I find real 
enjoyment in 
my work. (5) 
            
 
 
Q6 You are about halfway done.  The next sections refer to surveillance systems on the aircraft. 
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Q7 Please consider the Cockpit Voice Recorder/Flight Data Recorder (the "Black Boxes") together when answering 
the following statements and questions. 
 Strongly 
Agree (1) 
Agree (2) Somewhat 
Agree (3) 
Somewhat 
Disagree (4) 
Disagree (5) Strongly 
Disagree (6) 
The 
CVR/FDR 
impact my 
freedom to 
perform my 
job as I see 
fit. (1) 
            
The 
CVR/FDR 
irritate me. 
(2) 
            
The 
CVR/FDR 
diminish my 
ability to 
make 
decisions. (3) 
            
The 
CVR/FDR 
aggravate me. 
(4) 
            
The 
CVR/FDR 
manipulate 
the way I 
perform my 
job. (5) 
            
The 
CVR/FDR 
make me feel 
angry. (6) 
            
The 
CVR/FDR 
pressure me 
to modify 
certain 
practices I 
have had in 
the past. (7) 
            
The 
CVR/FDR 
annoy me (8) 
            
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Q8 To what extent do the following describe your feelings about the CVR and FDR? 
 Clearly 
describes my 
feelings (1) 
Mostly 
describes my 
feelings (2) 
Somewhat 
describes my 
feelings (3) 
Somewhat 
does not 
describe 
my 
feelings (4) 
Mostly does 
not describe 
my feelings 
(5) 
Clearly does 
not describe 
my feelings 
(6) 
hostility (1)             
unfair (2)             
distrust (3)             
hesitant (4)             
uneasy (5)             
intimidated (6)             
 
 
Q9 On a scale of 1 to 10, what is the underlying purpose of the "black boxes"? 
______ Safety (1) 
______ Performance (2) 
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Q11 Please consider the Flight Officer Quality Assurance program when answering the following statements and 
questions. 
 Strongly 
Agree (1) 
Agree (2) Somewhat 
Agree (3) 
Somewhat 
Disagree (4) 
Disagree (5) Strongly 
Disagree (6) 
The FOQA 
program 
impacts my 
freedom to 
perform my 
job as I see 
fit. (1) 
            
The FOQA 
program 
irritates me. 
(2) 
            
The FOQA 
program 
diminishes 
my ability to 
make 
decisions. (3) 
            
The FOQA 
program 
makes me 
feel angry. 
(4) 
            
The FOQA 
program 
manipulates 
the way I 
perform my 
job. (5) 
            
The FOQA 
program 
pressures me 
to modify 
certain 
practices I 
have had in 
the past. (6) 
            
The FOQA 
program 
aggravates 
me. (7) 
            
The FOQA 
program 
annoys me. 
(8) 
            
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Q12 To what extent do the following describe your feelings about the FOQA program? 
 Clearly 
describes my 
feelings (1) 
Mostly 
describes my 
feelings (2) 
Somewhat 
describes 
my 
feelings (3) 
Somewhat 
does not 
describe my 
feelings (4) 
Mostly does 
not describe 
my feelings 
(5) 
Clearly does 
not describe 
my feelings 
(6) 
hostility (1)             
unfair (2)             
distrust (3)             
hesitant (4)             
uneasy (5)             
intimidated (6)             
 
 
Q13 On a scale of 1 to 10, what is the underlying purpose of FOQA? 
______ Safety (1) 
______ Performance (2) 
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Q15 Please consider ACARS automated reporting function ("OOOI") when answering the following statements and 
questions. 
 Strongly 
Agree (1) 
Agree (2) Somewhat 
Agree (3) 
Somewhat 
Disagree (4) 
Disagree (5) Strongly 
Disagree (6) 
The ACARS 
automated 
reporting 
impacts my 
freedom to 
perform my job 
as I see fit. (1) 
            
The ACARS 
automated 
reporting 
irritates me. (2) 
            
The ACARS 
automated 
reporting 
diminishes my 
ability to make 
decisions. (3) 
            
The ACARS 
automated 
reporting 
makes me feel 
angry. (4) 
            
The ACARS 
automated 
reporting 
manipulates the 
way I perform 
my job. (5) 
            
The ACARS 
automated 
reporting 
pressures me to 
modify certain 
practices I have 
had in the past. 
(6) 
            
The ACARS 
automated 
reporting 
aggravates me. 
(7) 
            
The ACARS 
automated 
reporting 
annoys me. (8) 
            
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Q16 To what extent do the following describe your feelings about the ACARS automated reporting feature? 
 Clearly 
describes my 
feelings (1) 
Mostly 
describes my 
feelings (2) 
Somewhat 
describes 
my 
feelings (3) 
Somewhat 
does not 
describe my 
feelings (4) 
Mostly does 
not describe 
my feelings 
(5) 
Clearly does 
not describe 
my feelings 
(6) 
hostility (1)             
unfair (2)             
distrust (3)             
hesitant (4)             
uneasy (5)             
intimidated (6)             
 
 
Q17 On a scale of 1 to 10, what is the underlying purpose of the ACARS automated reporting? 
______ Safety (1) 
______ Performance (2) 
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Q19 How often have you:  (Remember your individual responses will be anonymous, and will not be shared with 
(the airline) or (THE UNION)) 
 Never (1) Rarely (2) Sometimes (3) Often (4) Nearly Always 
(5) 
Slowed down to 
intentionally miss a 
metric (1) 
          
Ignored calls from 
the scheduling desk 
(2) 
          
Called in sick when 
not actually sick (3)           
Intentionally 
disregarded dress 
and appearance 
standards (e.g. no 
hat) (4) 
          
Intentionally worn your (union) pin upside down or inappropriately (5)           
Reduced effort and 
quality in job areas 
not under direct 
surveillance (6) 
          
Placed a sticker on 
your fight bag 
displaying 
displeasure. For 
example: "No 
waivers, no favors, I 
follow the contract" 
(7) 
          
Intentionally caused 
the ACARS to make 
an erroneous report 
(e.g. to indicate a 
late pushback when 
actually on time) (8) 
          
Filed a (pilot report) 
simply to "cover" for 
a potential "FOQA 
tag" (9) 
          
Sought out more 
advice than 
necessary during an 
unusual situation 
that might be 
"FOQA tagged" (10) 
          
Said something for 
the CVR to record 
(e.g. "I don't agree 
with this course of 
action") (11) 
          
Other (12)           
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Q20 Over and above flying the aircraft safely, a pilot has a range of discretionary actions that might yield higher 
completion rates or increase efficiency of the operation ("operationally beneficial").   For instance, a Captain might 
decide to fly an aircraft with a mechanical writeup for a system (e.g. the APU) that is not necessarily required for the 
flight.  Or a First Officer might hustle some gate checked bags down to the baggage hold.  How often have you 
intentionally withheld an action that might have been "operationally beneficial", but was not specifically part of your 
contracted duties? 
 Never (1) 
 Rarely (2) 
 Sometimes (3) 
 Often (4) 
 Nearly Always (5) 
 
Q21 Overall, surveillance programs improve my on-the-job performance. 
 Strongly Disagree (1) 
 Disagree (2) 
 Agree (3) 
 Strongly Agree (4) 
 
Q22 Please provide any comments or observations you have about surveillance systems. 
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Q23 Video monitoring of the cockpit has been suggested by some to provide additional information in an accident 
or incident.  Consider a system that has one wide-angle camera behind the pilots that shows general motions and 
activities. 
 Strongly 
Agree (1) 
Agree (2) Somewhat 
Agree (3) 
Somewhat 
Disagree (4) 
Disagree (5) Strongly 
Disagree (6) 
The system 
would impact 
my freedom 
to perform 
my job as I 
see fit. (1) 
            
The system 
would irritate 
me. (2) 
            
The system 
would make 
me feel 
angry. (3) 
            
The system 
would 
diminish my 
ability to 
make 
decisions. (4) 
            
The system 
would 
manipulate 
the way I 
perform my 
job. (5) 
            
The system 
would 
pressure me 
to modify 
certain 
practices I 
have had in 
the past. (6) 
            
The system 
would 
aggravate me. 
(7) 
            
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Q24 To what extent do the following describe your feelings about a potential video monitoring system? 
 Clearly 
describes my 
feelings (1) 
Mostly 
describes my 
feelings (2) 
Somewhat 
describes my 
feelings (3) 
Somewhat 
does not 
describe 
my 
feelings (4) 
Mostly does 
not describe 
my feelings 
(5) 
Clearly does 
not describe 
my feelings 
(6) 
hostility (1)             
unfair (2)             
distrust (3)             
hesitant (4)             
uneasy (5)             
intimidated (6)             
 
 
Q25 On a scale of 1 to 10, what would be the underlying purpose for a video monitoring system? 
______ Safety (1) 
______ Performance (2) 
 
Q35 What is your primary concern about a video monitoring system? 
 Privacy issues (1) 
 Distrust of data safeguards/protocol (2) 
 Difficulty establishing contextual accuracy when evaluating pilot actions (3) 
 Other (4) ____________________ 
 
Q36 To what extent would you withhold beneficial discretionary behaviors, as described above, if a video system is 
installed? 
 Much Less (1) 
 Less (2) 
 The Same (3) 
 More (4) 
 Much More (5) 
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Q27 What is your current position? 
 Captain (1) 
 First Officer (2) 
 Furlough (3) 
 
Q28 What was your primary flying background before this airline? 
 Military (1) 
 Civilian (2) 
 
Q29 Is this the only airline you have flown for? 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
 
Q30 What is your gender? 
 Male (1) 
 Female (2) 
 
Q31 How old are you? 
 29 or younger (1) 
 30-39 (2) 
 40-49 (3) 
 50-59 (4) 
 60 or older (5) 
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Appendix C 
This appendix describes the posting of the survey on the pilots web forum and subsequent 
interaction with the membership.   
I initially posted the following: 
“Hi, my name is Pat Heflin, and I am conducting the final stages of a doctoral dissertation 
on surveillance in the cockpit.  I am a furloughed (company) pilot, being sponsored by the Air 
Force for my PhD.  The link below will direct you to a survey that will take approximately 15 
minutes to complete.  There are some sensitive questions, but I assure you the responses will not 
be shared with the union or the company, and will only be reported in aggregate in academic 
journals.  Your participation is completely voluntary and I appreciate your time and assistance in 
helping me research this important topic.” 
 I posted the link and left it overnight.  When I returned to the forum the next day, I had 
approximately 80 views, and four people had posted responses directly on the forum.  Two 
responses were positive and supportive, saying they completed the survey and wishing me good 
luck.  Two of these responses, however, were very negative and challenged my underlying 
motives and the nature of the research, and openly suggested I might be aligned with 
management.  One particular wanted to know my sources of funding, any affiliation with “any 
video surveillance companies”, and my hypotheses.  As calmly as I could, I posted this reply: 
 “I appreciate your concerns and understand the environment with management.  I can 
assure you this is only an academic study about behavioral responses to monitoring.  I am not 
affiliated with any company, and I receive no financial support for this research.  I just want to 
emphasize the voluntary nature of this survey and the fact that your responses will be completely 
anonymous.” 
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 One person who had posted a negative comment seemed satisfied, but chose not to 
participate in the survey.  The other person again challenged the nature of the survey itself, and 
suggested the company might be able to track respondents through IP addresses.  At this point, 
several other members posted in support of the research and survey, and a short discussion 
ensued about how unlikely the suggestion about IP addresses was and how it would not be 
admissible in a court of law.   
 It seemed like the initial negative posts stalled the response rate somewhat, for a period of 
about one day.  I was concerned about posting too much information in order to avoid 
establishing an emotional frame before respondents took the survey.  Once the supportive posts 
were made, the response rate resumed and it took approximately two weeks to achieve the final 
response rate.  In retrospect, I would have included a request to send a private message to me if 
there were concerns.  The public broadcasting of angst by a few members could have seriously 
impacted the response rate.   
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Appendix D 
Alternate and Supporting Empirical Analyses 
 
I also explored if state reactance mediates the effect of perception of threat on the 
dependent variables.  Following Baron and Kinney (1986), I used the causal steps mediation 
analysis for each system predicting the two dependent variables.  
Table 9 
 
The only evidence of mediation was in the model for FOQA and indirect resistance, and 
the results indicate partial mediation.  The first step in Baron & Kinney’s mediation technique, 
that threat perception predicts the respective dependent variable, does not meet significance 
criteria in the other five analyses.  This is somewhat surprising, given that state reactance 
significantly predicts each dependent variable and threat perception and state reactance are so 
highly correlated.  With this underwhelming support for mediation across control systems, 
further exploration of moderated mediation will add little explanatory value to the models and is 
not warranted. 
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 The Principal Component Analysis for the Dependent Variable Items resulted in three 
components with eigenvalues over 1.0, but the third is just slightly over 1.0.  Figure 5 shows the 
supporting Scree Plot, a graphical depiction of the component distribution. 
           Figure 5 
 
 
The Scree Plot for the PCA for all variables is shown below: 
          Figure 6 
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This paper is informed by Social Identity Theory (SIT), which says that individuals tend to categorize themselves and others in groups, (Hogg & Terry, 2000).  I also draw aspects from Identity Theory, with foundations in sociology, which refers more to the idea of “chronic identity salience”, which indicates that the most salient identity of many might motivate behavior (Hogg, Terry, & White, 1995).  By using the strength of company identity in the model, I am aligning most closely with the ideas of SIT, where the intensity that individuals have categorized themselves with a particular entity (in this case, the company) is predicted to moderate behavioral reactions.  Alternatively, an Identity Theory lens might analyze the most salient of the organizational identities, in place of the strength of a particular identity.  As a sensitivity check of the findings moderated by identity strength, I ran the same models by selecting a subsample of those pilots who identify most with the company.  66 of 217 survey respondents scored higher on the OID scale for the company than for the union or the profession (30.5%).  A sample size of 66 provides a power of .65 for a small effect size, indicating these results should be interpreted with some caution. 
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 As expected, the results from the subsample for Hypotheses 1 and 2 (Tables 10A, B, and C) are consistent with the results from the overall sample.  Hypothesis 1 is strongly supported, and Hypothesis 2 is not supported.  Hypotheses 3A,B and 4A,B (Tables 11A, B, and C), however, are much different.  Hypotheses 3A and 3B, predicting a relationship between state reactance and the two dependent variables, did not have a significant relationship across the three systems.  Hypothesis 4A and 4B, predicting a moderating effect by the strength of company identity on the reactance-behavior relationships, were also not supported for all systems. These findings informed by identity salience reinforce those reported in the main analysis, where the strength of identity moderated behavioral reactions to reactance.  In this sample of those pilots whose highest identity salience is with the company, individuals experience threats and subsequent elevated reactance, but higher identity with the company results in no relationship with behavioral reactions. 
 
